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Master's Thesis of International Studies

Xi Jinping Government's Foreign Policy toward South Korea

시진핑 정부의 對한국정책

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Abstract

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China and South Korea have normalized their relationship in 1992. Before diplomatic normalization, there has been indirect trade between China and South Korea which set the ground for the later rapprochement. Since the diplomatic normalization, China and South Korea have achieved brilliant progress in their bilateral relationship. For instance, South Korea decided to participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, which was initiated by China as a means to break out of the dollar trap for establishing a regional trading bloc in Eurasia. China and South Korea also concluded a free trade agreement in the same year.

Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the President of the People's Republic of China on November 15 of 2012, with world's heated debates over the rise of China on both economic and military facets. At the time Xi assumed office, both international and domestic circumstances have shifted drastically. Thus, Xi's diplomatic strategy as well as the South Korean policy have also been altered accordingly.

Due to the authoritarian characteristics of China's Communist Party (CCP), China's foreign policy towards South Korea has its own consistency. However, along with China's rise of both economic and military power, its South Korean policy has been revised as time changes.

Thus, this thesis will utilize the classical realism to analyze the shifts in international and domestic circumstances of Xi's government faced, and then

further investigate Xi's diplomatic strategy as well as the South Korean policy in comparison with his predecessors.

Keywords: China, South Korea, Sino-South Korean relations, South Korean policy, diplomatic strategy, Xi Jinping, Park Geun-hye, THAAD, classical realism

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I. Introduction

1.1 Research Background: History of China's Foreign Relations and its Relationship with South Korea

Since China's implementation of the 'Reform and Opening Up' policy in 1978, China has achieved brilliant economic growth and become an economic giant who are receiving great attention from all over the world. Along with its economic growth, China has made great efforts to secure its national interests and status in the international arena and has also undergone political, military, and social transformation in order to become a super power.

During Deng's administration (1977- 1989), both domestic developments and the international circumstances changed drastically. Domestically, the 'Reform and opening Up' policy was implemented and China began to turn into a socialist market economy. These domestic changes were crucial for China to act a totally different role in the international theater. International determinants also changed during this period and China headed for a different direction accordingly. Firstly, regarding the relationships with superpowers, Beijing's relations with Washington became both complex and contradictory and its relationship with the Soviet Union was a gradual turn back. Thus, on the basis of 'relative equidistance' between Washington and Moscow and of loud cries against alleged superpower attempts at world dominance, China constructed a 'new' policy of independence.¹ This roughly balanced policy towards two superpowers provided a concrete basis for a definitively positive turn toward the Third World.²

¹ Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 574

² Ibid.

Secondly, the international system and its regional Asian components were functioned as another influential factor. Economically, the explosion of international trade and investment made the world become economically interdependent. Militarily, the new revolution of strategic weapons with high accuracy and high-tech industry threw China into a military dilemma and Beijing wisely chose to place military modernization last among the Four Modernizations.³

The relation between interest and power was the last determinant of Chinese foreign policy. Diplomacy of negotiating capability and steersman-ship, the level and pace of economic development, cultural policy and military are four elements that determine national power. Based on these elements, it is reasonable for China to pursue its interests vibrantly. Yet, a kind of hiatus appeared in Chinese foreign policy due to its existing interests, which were the need to develop the country as fast as possible, competition with other Asian countries and minimization of China's influence in other regions, negated domestic consequences of the Deng reforms.

During the post-Cold War era (1989-), Chinese foreign policy has faced two major adjustments. First adjustment occurred during the dissolution process of bipolar international system, China experienced Tiananmen Square Incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, during the late-1990s, the Chinese leadership made another major adjustment on the foreign policy strategy which lasts to current days.⁴ Tiananmen Square Incident and the fall of the Communist blocs were the two major factors that led Chinese leaders to make new assessment

³ Ibid.

⁴ 조영남, 『21세기 중국이 가는 길』 (파주: 나남, 2009), pp. 231.

on the international environment and adjustment on foreign policy framework.⁵ Tiananmen affected China's ties with the outside world in two manners. Domestically, it begat a foreign policy of circle-the-wagons against an assumedly hostile, America-led Western world. Internationally, it vitally affected China's relations with many other states and sanctions of various sorts, mostly economic were placed on China.⁶ The downfall of Communist blocs resulted in China as one of the sole surviving Communist country with political isolation. As a result of these two events, China had to make a breakthrough of the containment by modifying its foreign policy strategy. Therefore, Beijing has forged a diplomatic strategy with two broad purposes: to maintain the international conditions that will make it feasible for China to focus on the domestic development; and to reduce the likelihood of the U.S. to abort China's ascent.⁷

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China faced major adjustment of foreign policy based on consideration over attaining an international status to a new level.⁸ Two crucial events, Asian Financial Crisis and the admittance of China to the WTO, affected China to shift its direction of foreign policy to truly operational multi-polarization and globalization. During the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) and its aftermath, China come up as a responsible power and began to pay more attention to the structural problems within its economy. Since then, China continued to obtain sustaining economic growth and began to engage with the international communities through acceding to the World Trade Organization in 2001. According to Youngnam Cho, there has been a new perspective on multi-

⁵ 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』 (과주: 나남, 2006), pp. 229.

⁶ Thomas W. Robinson (1994), pp. 588-589.

⁷ Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *The China Quarterly* 168 (December 2001), pp.836.

⁸ 조영남 (2009), pp. 231.

polarization within China. Previous multi-polarization strategy of China laid emphasis on changing power distribution via weakening the relative power of the United States or through balance of power strategy with other superpowers. Yet, according to the new viewpoint, the fundamental problem of the international regime was way of operation of international order rather than power distribution. Therefore, China has come up with theories such as “New Security Concept” and “New Order of International Political Economy” to attain support from international society and achieve its objectives.⁹ Also, China’s understanding of globalization has shifted towards comprehending it as a complex process which affects politics of superpowers, after undergoing the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 and facing tough attitude of the United States during the negotiation process of ascendance to the WTO. Thus, China apprehended the necessity of security cooperation to seek solution jointly, and learned that globalization can be utilized as a means to restrain American hegemony by interweaving interests of other states.¹⁰ Based on these new understandings, China set its major diplomatic objective as expanding the international influence along with creating peaceful and stable international circumstances which was conducive to domestic economic development. With the aim of achieving these goals, China shifted its diplomacies to active and omnidirectional diplomacies which contain big powers diplomacy targeting all big powers around the globe, peripheral diplomacy emphasizing both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with neighboring states, and multilateral diplomacy involving enactment of operational rules of international order via actively participating in international and regional institutions.

Henceforward, in order to stabilize peripheral circumstances and to maintain

⁹ 조영남 (2006), pp. 225.

¹⁰ 조영남 (2006), pp. 226-230.

peace, China will mediate relationships with superpowers and will gradually expand its leverage based on diplomatic route of pragmatism.¹¹ And this is not an exception for the Korean Peninsula which has distinctive geopolitical and geo-economic interests to China.¹² China's Korea policy in the era of Reform can roughly be divided into three phases: one-Korea (pro-Pyongyang policy), a one-Korea de jure/two-Koreas de facto policy, and a two-Koreas de jure and de facto policy¹³. During the Cold War era, South Korea was the "fascist" axis of the iron triangle of American imperialism and Japanese militarism for China¹⁴. And the Korean War made the Sino-South Korean relationship to rock the bottom. Thus, the ideological and political differences have made China to pursue one-Korea policy which recognize North Korea as the top priority for several decades. During this period, China's Korean policy was more close to a Korean factor which regards the Korean Peninsula as the bridge to communicate with the United States and the Soviet Union.

The most significant factors that influence China's Korean policy during 1980s and 1990s were sanctions from the United States as the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Incident and collapse of the Communist bloc. These two events caused diplomatic isolation of China. Thus, in order to "survive" in such an international context, China unavoidably chose to downgrade relationships with superpowers and to emphasize its identity as an East Asian and regional

¹¹ 박동훈, "중국의 대북정책 변화와 중한관계: 천안함 사건 이후를 중심으로", 『한국과 국제정치』 (제27권 제2호, 2011년, pp. 119-147) pp. 128

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Samuel S. Kim, "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of Reform," in David M. Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp.374

¹⁴ Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: The View from Korea," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of Emerging Power* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 33

power, and thus attaching special importance to its independent “good neighborly” policy.¹⁵ The period from 1991 to 1992 witnessed both Korea’s attainment of UN membership, which also propelled China’s rapprochement with South Korea and overcome North Korea’s angst along with the previously mentioned “good neighborly” policy. Thus, the abovementioned factors have led China and South Korea to normalize their diplomatic relations in 1992 which signifies China’s overtures from one-Korea de jure/two-Koreas de facto policy to two-Koreas de jure and de facto policy.

1.2 Research Question and Scope

1.2.1 Research Question

Due to the authoritarian characteristics of China’s Communist Party (CCP), China’s foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula has its own consistency. However, as China’s rise in both economic and security facets, as well as cataclysmic circumstances of East Asian region, China’s foreign policy has been revised as time changes. Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the President of the People’s Republic of China on November 15 of 2012. Xi assumed office in a special time with world’s heated debates over the rise of China on both economic and military facets. During the last five years of Xi’s tenure, Xi has presented a hardline position on security issues and national interests. China has also taken a hard stance toward North Korea, while presenting diplomatic offensive toward South Korea under Xi’s administration, which are definitely distinctive characteristics of China’s foreign policy compared with Xi’s predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.

Thus, the research question of this thesis would be what are the changed and

¹⁵ Xiaoxiong Yi (1995) China's Korea Policy: From “One Korea” to “Two Koreas”, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 22:2, 119-140, DOI: 10.1080/00927678.1995.9933702, pp. 121

unchanged elements of China's foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula and what are the fundamental motives that affect the evolution of its South Korean policy under Xi's administration.

1.2.2 Justification

After the Reform and Opening up policy, China has made great efforts to secure its national interests and status in the international arena. Since it turned into a socialist market economy, China has achieved brilliant economic growth and become an economic giant who is receiving great attention from all over the world. However, China's rise has aroused wariness and fears of its neighboring states. In order to assure neighboring states and emphasize its rise with peaceful characteristics, Chinese Communist Party has established a series of foreign policies, such as New Security Outlook, Peaceful Development, Harmonious Society, etc. Among its foreign policies, China's Neighbor Diplomatic Policy recently has been raised to the utmost crucial foreign policy. Among its neighboring states, the Korean Peninsula has unique strategic status to China, which shares close ties with the United States and Japan and has great economic binds with China. Therefore, the Korean Peninsula, which consists of North and South Korea, has been one of the most strategic areas for China to cope with. Therefore, in this thesis, the evolution of China's foreign policy towards South Korea and future prospects will be analyzed.

1.3 Literature Review

From 2013 to 2017, China and South Korea have gone through "politically and economically hot" in the early stage and "politically and economically cold" in the later stage. Sino-South Korean relationship during Xi Jinping's and Park Geun-hye's administration has critical importance since the diplomatic normalization between the two countries in 1992. South Korea's participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Park's attendance in the Victory

Day parade on September 3rd of 2015, conclusion of the China-South Korea free trade agreement, and the deployment of the THAAD, all of these issues have brought about debates and discussions on characteristics of Sino-South Korean relationship as well as the future perspectives for the bilateral relations.

On the mutual visits between President Xi and Park to each other's country, Kim Jin Ho and Kim Heung have similar views. Kim Jin Ho demonstrates that Xi's official visit to South Korea shows South Korea's strategic values to China have been risen. He also argues that China realized that it is extremely important for China to form friendly relations with South Korea through economic and public diplomacy in order to break through influence of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Heungkyu also claims that Park's visit to China successfully established good relationship with China's new leadership and received China's positive responses on North Korean nuclear issues and reunification issues of the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, Xi's visit to South Korea symbolizes China's attachment of its importance to neighboring countries, especially South Korea.

As regards the THAAD deployment and the US-Japan-South Korean triangular alliances, Cui Yongjie states that China's responses to the THAAD deployment can be recognized on military, economic, and diplomatic facets. Militarily, China would upgrade missile technology and deploy interference installations in the Northeast. Economically, China would implement economic retaliation on South Korea. And diplomatically, China would cooperate with Russia to counterbalance the US-ROK military alliance. Li Daguang reasons that the THAAD deployment has forged military integration of the US, Japan and South Korea which aims to confront with the rising China and Russia. He further argues that the THAAD deployment in South Korea would break the military balance of Northeast Asia, and thus, China should take uncompromising position on this issue.

Concerning North Korean nuclear issues, Cui Yan concludes China's foreign policy toward North Korea's nuclear issues on three facets. On security policies, China makes its efforts to cooperate with Northeast Asian countries to overcome North Korean nuclear issues. On economic policies, China endeavors to lead and support North Korea to implement economic reforms. And on foreign policies, China continues to enhance friendship with North Korea and persuade North Korea to participate in regional cooperation. Jin Yongshan analyzes Sino-South Korean strategic cooperative partnership in terms of North Korean nuclear issues. To maintain peace of the Korean Peninsula is one of the prerequisites for South Korea to achieve unification and maintain economic prosperity. China and South Korea hold common understanding and objectives on the maintenance of peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. Thus, China and South Korea should enhance the strategic cooperative partnership, support North Korea to implement economic reform, and make efforts to build cooperative mechanism of security in the Northeast Asia.

Regarding state of affairs between China and South Korea, Lee Dongryul analyzes events and incidents happened between China and South Korea after Xi and Park assumed office and brings up future prospects for Sino-South Korean relationship. He denotes that China has adopted diplomatic offensive towards South Korea after Xi took power, and Sino-South Korean relationship is fragile on account of the existence of North Korea.

There are many theses and articles that analyze relationship between China and South Korea on various events and incidents. Yet, there are few theses analyzing the comprehensive framework of Xi's South Korean policy and the differences of Xi's administration on South Korean policy compared with its predecessors. Thus, this thesis will analyze successions and deviations as well as characteristics of Xi's foreign policy toward South Korea.

1.4 Methodology

This thesis will analyze China's foreign policy towards South Korea in chronological order, and will emphasize the evolution process after diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea in 1992. Methods of this thesis will be classical realism, which contains three core tenets: the acknowledgement of the reality of power, an unwillingness to automatically privilege the perspective of those that would defend the status quo, and politics matters and therefore, the future is largely unwritten. And the third tenet indicates that states enjoy strategic choices which consist of domestic and international politics.

Normally, structural realism is extensively used to analyze mechanisms of international politics which emphasizes 'balance of power (BOP)'. BOP results from the desire and relative abilities to maximize relative power in order to constrain each other. Therefore, it is the 'relative power' that matters and the driving factor behind a state's foreign policy is not internal politics but externally-determined structural imperatives. However, classical realism emphasizes 'politics' which indicates that states enjoy strategic choices, which consists of both domestic and international politics. So the changes of governments are not functioning in 'structural realism' but in 'classical realism' it is of great importance. Since diplomatic strategy of Xi's government would have differences compared with previous administrations and accordingly its foreign policy towards South Korea would also have differences. Thus, this thesis utilizes 'classical realism' to analyze Xi's foreign policy towards South Korea.

In addition, this thesis will utilize literature materials, which consist of government announcements, official remarks, related theses and journals, and statistical data.

II. Evolution of Sino-South Korean Relations

2.1 Sino-South Korean Relations before 1988

During the period of 1950s and 1960s, Sino-South Korean relations were deeply hostile to each other due to the Korean War and the Cold War afterwards. China maintained a “lips-and-teeth” relationship with North Korea and had no official relations with South Korea. During the Cold War, due to the ideological differences between capitalism and communism as well as the absence of official ties severed by the Japanese colonial rule, China-Korea relationships were presented in the form of “two parallel relationships” – ROK-ROC and DPRK-PRC relations.¹⁶ Nevertheless, international structure shifted rather drastically during the 1970s and the most stunning events were the diplomatic normalization of China with the United States and Japan. This was due to the ideological divide between China and the Soviet Union which fractured the international communist movement and laid foundation for the thawing of relations between China and the United States. Therefore, as one member of the capitalist camp, South Korea concluded that improving its relationship with China would be helpful to reduce tensions and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula¹⁷. In 1972, South Korea modified Article 2 of its foreign trade law to permit trade with communist countries other than North Korea and Cuba.¹⁸ China also noted South Korea’s success in economic modernization which has spectacularly risen from one of the poorest states in the world to a high-income state just in several decades. Although it is still crucial for China to preserve North Korea as a friendly regime on its border during the post-Cold War era, with the economic

¹⁶ Jae Ho Chung, *Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp.29.

¹⁷ Chung (2007), pp.30.

¹⁸ Ibid.

development consolidated as China's state policy, the potential for an economic partnership with South Korea began to beckon irresistibly.¹⁹ Therefore, the two countries started economic exchange, mainly indirect trade in 1979.


According to Jae Ho Chung, Sino-South Korean economic relations during the pre-rapprochement period consists of two phases, initiation phase (1979-1983) and expansion phase (1984-1987). In the initiation phase of Sino-South Korean economic development, trade was the only meaningful area of bilateral cooperation.²⁰ During this period, trade remained indirect in the form of re-export due to the concern for any sign of discontent of North Korea. As expected, owing to fierce complaints filed by North Korea, the bilateral economic relationship at this point was thus extremely volatile. Nevertheless, the bilateral indirect trade volume between China and South Korea increased more than seven times from \$19 million in 1979 to \$134 million in 1983. During the expansion phase, it was the improving relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union that has led China to expand bilateral ties with South Korea more voluntarily. Also, attributable to its acute need for foreign currency earnings, developmental capital, and advanced technology for the Reform and Opening up, China became more receptive to expanding economic exchanges with South Korea. By 1985, China's total trade with Seoul surpassed that of Pyongyang²¹. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the trend of indirect trade during these initiation and expansion period.

¹⁹ Yi (1995), pp.122.

²⁰ Chung (2007), pp.32-34.


²¹ Cha (1999), pp.34.

FIGURE 1. Trends in Sino-South Korean Overall Trade



Source: Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea-China Economic Relations: The Current Situation and Its Implications”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (Oct, 1988). pp.1037

FIGURE 2. Import-Export Patterns in Sino-South Korean Trade Through Hong Kong (US\$ Million)



Source: Chung (1988), pp.1038.

2.2 Rapprochement Period (1988-1992) and Normalization of Diplomatic Relations in 1992.

Sino-South Korean relationship has developed drastically from 1988 to 1992. In 1988, the Seoul Olympic Games provided a significant arena for China and South Korea to further enhance their economic cooperation. Along with China's dispatch of its athletes and coaches, South Korea successfully invited many

socialist countries including China, which indicated a crucial diplomatic breakthrough. In the year of the Olympic Games, the trade volume of the bilateral trade between China and South Korea reached 3,087 million US dollars, which was almost two times than the volume of the previous year.

However, the Tiananmen Square Incident brought the Sino-South Korean relationship into a historic low. As mentioned in the previous part, the incident vitally affected China's relations with many other states and sanctions of various sorts, mostly economic sanctions were placed on China. Although South Korea refrained from implementing sanctions on China, the bilateral trade following the incident only increased by 1.8 percent.

Since the initiation phase of Sino-South Korean economic cooperation in the 1970s, North Korea was one of the obstacles that impeded development between the two countries.²² China's blood brotherhood with North Korea inhibited political rapprochement between China and South Korea and led China to stick to nongovernmental and later semi-governmental ties with South Korea. This is evidenced by South Korea's much more rapid development of relationship with Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union by 1990, which already achieved diplomatic normalization. Yet, this situation encountered a crucial break point from 1991 to 1992. The United Nations provided both South and North Korea with UN membership, resulted in improvement of inter-Korean relations, which enabled China to overcome North Korea's discontent and to further develop relationship with South Korea.

Another significant factor that enabled China to improve its relationship with South Korea was Roh Tae Woo's nordpolitik policy. In December 1987, after Roh Tae Woo was elected as the president of South Korea, Roh's administration

²² Chung (2007), pp. 53-54.

implemented nordpolitik, the “northern diplomacy” toward socialist states.²³ The policy called for “the improvement of inter-Korean relations as well as South Korea’s relations with other socialist countries in conformity with the principles of equity, respect, and mutual prosperity.” Under the nordpolitik, the indirect trade between China and South Korea grew dramatically during the 1980s. Sports diplomacy also enlarged along with the trade expansion. In the 1986 Asian Games hosted in South Korea, China sent the largest delegation to Seoul. And in the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, China sent more than four hundred athletes to the event. Moreover, South Korea refused to implement sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.

Between 1991 and 1992, institutionalization of economic relations cleared way for the normalization of diplomatic relations. In October of 1990, China agreed to establish trade relations with South Korea, which led to the setting up of trade representative offices in 1991. This decision between China and South Korea pushed bilateral economic relations from indirect trade to direct trade, which was a huge breakthrough of Sino-South Korean economic relations.

All of the abovementioned factors resulted in the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992.²⁴ On April 13, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ock agreed on the ground rules of their negotiations on the normalization. In June, Qian traveled to North Korea to inform and gain agreement from Kim Il Sung on Sino-South Korean normalization. And on August 24, the final PRC-ROK normalization treaty, the six-point joint communique was released by both Chinese and South Korean government, which symbolized the normalization of diplomatic relations

²³ Samuel S. Kim (2001), pp. 376-378.

²⁴ Samuel S. Kim (2001), pp. 382-384.

between China and South Korea.

2.3 Beyond Normalization, 1992-Nowadays

After the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea in 1992, Sino-South Korean relations have upgraded from “good-neighborly relations”, “cooperative partnership”, “comprehensive cooperative partnership” to “strategic cooperative partnership” within three decades, which has undergone a great qualitative leap. Meanwhile, there are also contradictions between the two states. According to Youngnam Cho, there are roughly four big tendencies in Sino-South Korean relations after the normalization in 1992. Firstly, Sino-South Korean relations became complicated on account of drastically enlarging major domains and agents. Secondly, imbalanced development among major domains became deepened. Thirdly, discordance between official regulation and actual relationship became widened. And last but not least, asymmetry became expanded owing to the differences in national power.²⁵

The most eye-catching phenomena of Sino-South Korean relations during the last 25 years are pluralized main agents of communication and expanded domains of relationship.²⁶ In the rapprochement period of China and South Korea, as mentioned earlier, it were state governments and trading companies that were the main players in Sino-South Korean relations. Comparatively, nowadays, there are various agents which form a multilayered and complex relationship. Figure 3 demonstrates the quantity of South Korean and Chinese students studying at each other’s country, which is a huge leap forward.

²⁵ 조영남, 『용과 춤을 추자』 (서울: 민음사, 2012), pp. 331.

²⁶ 조영남 (2012), pp. 332.

Figure 3. Number of South Korean and Chinese students studying at each other's country			
	1992	2010	2016
Chinese students in South Korea	1182	58,000	70,540
South Korean students in China	4000	63,000	66,672

Source: Ministry of Justice

Development of major domains has evolved rather unevenly, and it is manifested as economic > societal > political > security issue areas.²⁷ Regarding economic area, China and South Korea have improved their economic relationship in a remarkable manner. Since the pre-rapprochement period, the South Korean economy was regarded as opportunities for China to be exploited to make progress in their own economic development through constructing socialist market economy system. The unabated increase in trade and investment was highly conducive to the sustenance of the bilateral relations well beyond normalization.²⁸ Economic interaction between China and South Korea is largely steered by bilateral trade. As illustrated in Figure 4, in 1992, total trade volume between China and South Korea reached at 6.4 billion US dollars, while in 2016, it has reached at 211.4 billion US dollars which has increased more than 30 times within 25 years. Also, currently China is the largest trading partner to South Korea and South Korea is the fourth largest trading partner for China. According to Cheong Young-Rok, there are two distinct traits in Sino-South Korean trade and investment. The first one is that complementary commodity composition between two countries led to a speedy increase in trade volume owing to the situation that China is still dramatically building up its heavy industry as well as its light industry.²⁹ The second trait is about the relationship between Korean investment

²⁷ 조영남 (2012), pp. 332.

²⁸ Chung (2007), pp. 78.

²⁹ Cheong Yong-rok, *Impact of China on South Korea's Economy*, Dynamic Forces on the Korean Peninsula: Strategic & Economic Implications

and trade, in which trade can be interpreted as investment-driven bilateral trade.³⁰

Figure 4 Sino-South Korean Trade After Normalization (in US\$ millions)

Year	Total	Export to China	Import from China	Balance
1992	6,380	2,650	3,730	-1,080
1993	9,080	5,150	3,930	1,220
1994	11,660	6,200	5,460	740
...				
2000	31,250	18,450	12,800	5,650
2001	31,490	18,190	13,300	4,890
...				
2010	188,412	116,838	71,574	45,264
2011	220,617	134,185	86,432	47,753
...				
2015	227,374	137,124	90,250	46,874
2016	211,413	124,433	86,980	37,453

Source: KITA 2017

Regarding societal issue area, all possible formal channels of communications between China and South Korea were set up with the normalization of relations and the establishment of embassies.³¹ Firstly, the number of people travelling between the two countries has soared rapidly. The routes of ferry and air transportation have been established and the package travelling for each country has been produced. As Figure 5 demonstrates, the total number of visitors between China and South Korea has augmented from 152,000 in 1993 to 12,853,000 in 2016. Secondly, number of Chinese and South Korean students studying in each other's country has augmented as well as mentioned in Figure 3. Last but not least, migrating workers currently are travelling habitually between China and South Korea. Many Korean Chinese are working in South Korea and many Korean workers mainly at the management level are also

<http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/09.Cheong.pdf> pp. 65.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Chung (2007), pp. 83.

working in China.³²

Figure 5. Number of Visitors between China and South Korea (1,000s)

Year	Chinese Visitors	Korean Visitors	Total
1993	40	112	152
1995	81	407	488
2001	480	1,290	1,770
2003	513	1,561	2,074
2010	1,875	4,076	5,951
2012	2,836	4,069	6,905
2014	6,126	4,181	10,307
2016	8,067	4,786	12,853

Source: Korea Tourism Organization

Political exchanges have obtained continuous development after diplomatic normalization. China and South Korea have held summit meetings for 39 times since 1993, and the recent one was in July of 2017 between President Moon Jae-in and Xi Jinping for the formation of bilateral consensus on current sensitive subjects. Among the 39 times of bilateral summit meetings between China and South Korea, six summit meetings have been convened in South Korea and fourteen summit meetings conducted in China. And the rest of them were held during other occasions such as APEC. The change of leadership which requires political and social stability would lead to reinforcement of pragmatism towards South Korea, and political exchanges will continue in a rather smooth manner owing to the national interests and necessity of economic development.

Compared with political exchanges, military exchanges and cooperation grew more slowly, presumably on account of China's reluctance to antagonize North Korea.³³ Generally speaking, military diplomacy can be differentiated between

³² Cheong (2005), pp. 69.

³³ Robert G. Sutter, *China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils* (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp. 158.

military exchange and military cooperation.³⁴ Military exchange means simply exchange personnel, armament, equipment, and information with other countries, while military cooperation indicates cooperating military activities with other countries on a policy-making level.³⁵ Bilateral military exchanges and cooperation between China and South Korea are rather staying at mutual exchange level and the mainstream is the visiting of South Korean military leaders to China rather than mutual visiting in the aspect of form of activities.³⁶ Principally, there are two rationales for slowly growing military and security relationship. The first one is domestic causes related to the specialty of Chinese army as well as bureaucratic and administrative factors of China.³⁷ The second one is an external cause which links to Sino-North Korean relationship and U.S.-South Korean relationship.³⁸ In spite of the “strategic cooperative partnership” between China and South Korea, on account of the consideration and relationship with North Korea as well as check towards U.S.-ROK alliances, China is rather negative on bilateral military cooperation with South Korea.

The third tendency is the widening discordance between official regulation and actual relationship. The keynote of China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula can be concluded in one sentence, which is “maintaining peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and enlarging China’s influence toward the Korean Peninsula.”³⁹ Based on this policy keynote, it can be denoted that China attaches

³⁴ 조영남 (2012), pp. 339.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ 이동률, 「2014년 한중관계 평가와 전망」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 전문가 워크숍 (’14.12.28-29), pp. 13.

³⁷ 조영남 (2012), pp. 340.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ 전병곤, “冷戰結束後中國的韓半島政策”, 『중국연구』 44권 0호 (2008), pp. 386.

importance to bilateral relationship with South Korea and keeps in mind that mutual benefits of economic development, good ties of political relationship, and military and security cooperation are the key points of maintaining good relationship with South Korea. Thus, since the diplomatic normalization in 1992, official regulations of bilateral relations have been revised for certain times.

From 1992 to 1997, bilateral relations have been mainly focused on economic relations. During Roh Tae-woo's and Kim Young-sam's administration, China and South Korea signed multiple agreements on mutual economic and cultural cooperation. Yet, cooperation on political and security issue areas remained in formal stage. From 1998 to 2003, Sino-South Korean relationship promoted as "cooperative partnership with the official visit of President Kim Dae-jung in 1998. Also, with the visit of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003, it elevated to "comprehensive cooperative partnership". During this period, domains of cooperation were expanded from economic ones to political and security areas. China and South Korea agreed on enhancing information exchanges in order to overcome the Asian Financial Crisis⁴⁰. In addition, the two countries agreed on enhancing cooperation in the areas of military, drugs, terrorism, international crimes, and environment. From 2003 to 2008, Sino-South Korean relationship has been developed into substantive level. With the official visit of President Lee Myung-bak in 2008, bilateral relationship between China and South Korea fostered to "strategic cooperative partnership". During this period, bilateral trade expanded to an unprecedented level, and bilateral cooperation expanded from traditional economic ones to strategic domains regarding order and security of Northeast Asia such as nuclear issues of North Korea. From 2009 to present, Sino-South Korean relationship is considered as the extension of the "strategic cooperative partnership", which was denoted as "mature cooperative

⁴⁰ 전병곤 (2008), pp. 387-388.

partnership”. During this period, both cooperation and conflicts took apart. Economically, China and South Korea signed a free trade agreement (FTA) and it went into force in 2015. South Korea also confirmed its intention to take part in the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. On the other hand, continuously happened nuclear issue of North Korea and South Korea’s decision to launch Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) poured oil on the flame and deepened conflicts between the two countries. Despite the deepening cooperation and conflicts, the problem lies in the fact that such official regulations are only rhetoric for diplomatic achievement of specific administrations rather than reflecting actual bilateral relationships.⁴¹

The fourth tendency of Sino-South Korean relationships after diplomatic normalization is expanding asymmetry owing to the differences in national power. Along with the rise of China, differences in national power especially the physical force of economic and military power between China and South Korea have become wider and wider.⁴² This tendency will become reinforced. In addition, feelings of wariness of South Korea toward China as well as China’s disregard and dissatisfaction toward South Korea will be heightened.

⁴¹ 조영남 (2012), pp. 343.

⁴² 조영남 (2012), pp. 344.

III. Elective Events of Sino-South Korean Conflicts

There have been both cooperation and conflicts between China and South Korea after the diplomatic normalization in 1992. In this part, four representative events have been selected as the analytical incidents to analyze the new characteristics of the policy of Xi Jinping's administration in Sino-South Korean relationships.

3.1 Conflicts during 2000s

3.1.1 “Garlic War” between China and South Korea⁴³

The “garlic war” between China and South Korea started in June of 2006 with South Korea's full-fledged safeguard on garlic imports from China. In response, Chinese government immediately counterattacked by banning imports of mobile handsets and polyethylene from South Korea. This ‘trade war’ which was stirred up by a little garlic lasted for three years with several times of negotiations and re-negotiations.

With the opening of the market along with the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, imports of agricultural products such as onion, pepper, garlic, and sesame from China to South Korea gained a sudden increase. Among them, South Korea's staple crop, garlic's importation from China was the most astounding increase. Despite South Korea imposed high rate tariff of 369% on the amount of garlic which exceeded the amount that was applied by low rate tariff of 50% according to the minimal market access legislated during the Uruguay trade negotiation in 1993, the volume of Sino-South Korean bilateral trade of fresh garlic soared by four times within two years from 1996 to 1998. On the other hand, frozen and pickled garlic were considered as of little demand in South

⁴³ Analyses of this part are based on the information provided by National Archives of Korea. Information can be found in <http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=003099>

Korea and these two products were imposed on a 30% of low rate tariff. Nevertheless, imports of the two products from China also augmented by more than nine times in 1999 compared with one in 1996. This was due to China's active export strategy that farmers in Shandong Province actively cultivated garlic targeted as export products to South Korea which accounted for 70 percent of export volume of garlic, and installed refrigeration equipment as well.

Along with the increase of the imports from China, the market share of imported garlic in South Korea soared up from 3.3% in 1996 to 12.2% in 1999. This situation resulted in a sharp decrease of farm prices and wholesale market prices by 42.4% and 37.9% in 1999 compared to last year. Although the sudden drop in garlic prices were largely on account of the increase of imports from China, it was also owing to the increase of domestic production as well.⁴⁴ Under this circumstance, garlic farmers in South Korea made petition to the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) to increase the tariff on imported garlic. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) gave support to the NACF and garlic farmers, and the committee of trade under NACF decided to pose 285% of emergency tariffs on frozen and pickled garlic for 200 days from October of 1999 based on the judgment that it was tough to revitalize the domestic market unless urgently took remedial action on the imported garlic from China.

In retaliation, China immediately took actions by implementing an import ban on two industrial goods, mobile handsets and polyethylene from South Korea. On June 29th of 2000, Chinese and South Korean government resumed the garlic negotiation in Beijing and reached an agreement that period of safeguard would end up by the end of 2002 which was six months less than the original plan. Also,

⁴⁴ Chung Jae Ho, "How China Response to Trade Sanctions: Decoding the Sino-South Korean 'Garlic War'", in David Zweig and Chen Zhimin (eds.), *China's Reforms and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2007) pp. 189.

in return for China's lift of import ban on mobile handsets and polyethylene, Korea made a decision to conduct tariff quota rate on frozen and pickled garlic imported from China in which Korea had to import 20,000 tons every year and import the MMA quota of 11,895 tons of two garlic products with a low rate of tariff as 50%.

During the whole affair, China's mode of reaction towards South Korea's full-fledged safeguard was atypical. Although the percentage of garlic exportation accounted rather small part among the whole export products in China, it firstly decided to impose an import ban rather than the tariff increase.⁴⁵ Furthermore, China's import ban was imposed on two industrial goods, the value of which far surpassed that of the garlic.

According to Chung Jae Ho, there are several reasons for China to choose such way of retaliation towards South Korea.⁴⁶ Firstly, China's decision to retaliate harshly can be attributed to the trade deficit of China after the diplomatic normalization in 1992. Since 1992, South Korea obtained large amount of trade surpluses trading with China, and it seemed that China was eager to retrieve the loss through the exports of agricultural products including garlic-related products. In addition, since the amount of imports of garlic only accounted for a small percentage of South Korea, Chinese officials were emotionally offended by South Korea's intention to cut garlic imports while it maintained trade surpluses with China. Secondly, it was connected with *mianzi* (face), which was a unique characteristic possessed by Chinese foreign policy. Chinese regarded South Korea's safeguard measures as ungrounded and unfair, thus undermining their face. And last but not least, regarding the accession to the WTO, China pondered

⁴⁵ Chung (2007), pp. 190.

⁴⁶ Chung (2007), pp. 191-195.

seriously the potential domestic problems associated with it. Acceding to the WTO meant that there would be the increase of unemployment rate in the rural area which would cause serious social problems. Therefore, when South Korea imposed the safeguard mechanism permitted under the WTO rules, China might have considered it as the last opportunity to employ retaliatory sanctions not authorized by the WTO. It would also act as a warning to other countries.

3.1.2 “Northeast Project”

China’s “Northeast Project” (*dongbei gongcheng*) is a national academic project which aims to confirm that northeastern China including *Koguryo* that once located there is part of the history of China’s Middle Kingdom. Although Chinese government affirmed that the project is just an academic project, it is in fact a political project led by Chinese central government which designed as a five-year project from 2002 to 2007 and cost an astounding amount of 20 billion Chinese yuan.

China and South Korea have demonstrated polarized reactions in view of the fact that Chinese citizens lacked the awareness and opportunities to encounter the information of such a historical project while Korean citizens presented fierce resistance due to China’s claims towards their own history of *Koguryo*. In addition, owing to the political sensitiveness of the project, diplomatic conflicts between China and South Korea became deepened and media coverage of the two countries amplified these conflicts.

According to Jun-young Kang, there are mainly three reasons for China to launch the “Northeast Project”.

“First, it stands to reason that the steady power shift in Northeast Asia – including China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear crisis, readjustments in the US-ROK alliance, and Japan’s elevated status in the US East Asia strategy – must have a place in it. Second, North Korea’s future and the two-million strong ethnic Koreans in the

northeastern provinces must remain a serious concern for China's political leaders and strategists. Third, a unified Korea's possible claim over the Gando region – which extends to much of Manchuria – well into the future can be nipped in the bud should any ancient histories of China's current northeastern region be incorporated as part of China's own proud and rich history.”⁴⁷

China's official remarks have poured oil on the fire. On June 24, 2003, a journal for the Communist Party of China, the *Guangming Ribao* reported, “Koguryo was an ancient nation established by a Chinese minority tribe.”⁴⁸ According to the interview with Ma Dazheng, a researcher on the “Northeast Project”, which was also recorded on the previously mentioned newspaper, he said that “This project is a political issue, and the issue of border area is closely interconnected with stability of China and solidarity of Chinese people.”⁴⁹ Also, on October 29 of 2007, a journal named *Global Times* reported that “Recently South Korea's view of history incurs anxiety of neighboring countries.”⁵⁰ Then it added that “Mass media, textbook, and dramas are distorting history and glamorizing their own country.”

On the other hand, South Korea's fierce opposition has evolved into political debates which were heavily covered by the mass media. Among them, most well-known theoretical argument was “China threat theory”. “China threat theory” was

⁴⁷ Taeho Kim, “Sino-Rok Relations at 15: An Overview and Assessment,” Working Paper series No. 185 (August 2007), Center for Asian Pacific Studies (Lingnan University, Hong Kong), pp. 360 -361.

⁴⁸ “What China's Northeast Project Is All About,” Chosun Ilbo, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/05/30/2008053061001.html (Assess Date: 2017/10/30)

⁴⁹ 「中国边疆史地研究的新进展-访中国边疆史地研究中心马大正研究员」,『光明日报』, http://jds.cssn.cn/ztyj/zl/201605/t20160506_3322712.shtml (检索日: 2017年10月30日)

⁵⁰ 「教科书随意改历史 韩国反思歪曲历史现象」,『环球时报』, http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0728/21/607082_42124681.shtml (检索日: 2017年10月30日)

first introduced by Ross H. Munro, who is the director of Asian Studies at the Center for Security Studies. He denotes that “China views the United States not as a strategic partner but as an obstacle for its rise, and it is unavoidable for China and the United States to be at war.”⁵¹ This theory received a favorable response by Korean citizens mainly due to the “Northeast Project” during 2000s. Thus, the atmosphere that can openly criticize China was made in South Korea, and accordingly “the US-Japan-Korea alliance triangle theory” began to be strengthened at this point.⁵² In addition, the awareness that “Northeast Project” incorporates China’s ambition towards territory was spread by the mass media and “China threat theory” obtained more power in South Korea. The way that such an anti-Chinese sentiment proliferated in an easy manner in South Korea owes to the fact that perspective of viewing the problem of “Northeast project” from Chinese Hegemonism has gained predominating influence over Korean mass media.

In the face of such fierce resistance from Korean citizens, Chinese government planned to step back from its irredentist claims. In August of 2004, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei visited South Korea and responded with a five-point verbal agreement including a pledge that the Chinese government and the state-run media would not seek any distortions of history. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun discussed the implications of the Koguryo disputes in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in September of 2005.⁵³ Also, in 2005, Chinese government removed a headline on a website which stated that people of Koguryo

⁵¹ 조용성, 『중국의 미래 10년』, (서울: 넥서스, 2012년), pp. 27.

⁵² 김종성 권택규 이현주 강성봉, “동북공정에 관한 한, 중 언론의 보도태도”, 『서림』 (제30호, 2008년 6월, pp. 349 - 377), pp. 362-363.

⁵³ Stella Xu, 『Reconstructing Ancient Korean History: The Formation of Korean-ness in the Shadow of History』 (London: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 2.

did not share the same blood with Korean people.

3.2 Conflicts during 2010s

3.2.1 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incident

On March 26 of 2010, South Korea's corvette Cheonan was hit by a torpedo and sunk in waters nearby the Baengnyeongdo, the island near the borders between the North and South Korea.⁵⁴ During the incident, forty South Korean naval personnel were sacrificed and six were disappeared. The South Korean government organized civil and military investigation groups and invited experts from Australia, the United States, Sweden, and Britain to figure out the truth behind the incident. The joint investigation group published a report and declared that it was North Korea that attacked the Cheonan. North Korea was strongly opposed to the report of the joint investigation group stating that it was unrelated to the incident. On July 9 of 2010, the United Nations Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the attacker but without naming it due to the pressure from China.

On November 23 of 2010, North Korea bombarded the Yeonpyeong Island of South Korea by firing artillery shells, which caused four deaths including South Korean citizens and military personnel. The Yeonpyeong bombardment was the first incident that North Korea directly shelled South Korean territory causing civilian deaths. Nevertheless, North Korea asserted that full responsibility belonged to South Korea and their bombardment was a reasonable military response in spite of the condemnation from international society. China called both South and North Korea for the maintenance of peace and stability in the

⁵⁴ Zhu Zhiquan, "The sinking of the Cheonan, the shelling of Yeonpyeong and China-North Korean relations," http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/Vol2No4_ZhuZhiquan, (Asses Date: 2017/10/30)

Korean Peninsula, but did not openly condemn North Korea.

China observed the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incident as inter-states subject between North and South Korea.⁵⁵ Thus, it was seriously dissatisfied with South Korea's reaction to bring the issues to the UN Security Council to 'exaggerate' the incidents. South Korea seriously condemned China's efforts to protect North Korea from being censured by international community, and doubted China's qualification as a credible member of the Six Party Talks. Furthermore, China protested against the US-ROK joint military exercise held in the Western waters to deter North Korea's further provocation. In response, China also conducted military exercises in the near waters to express discontent against the US-ROK military exercises.

Such responses from China were resulted from boost of China's self-identification in the international society, enhancement of its voice on economic facet, and distrust caused by rebalancing strategy of the United States.⁵⁶ Therefore, China has viewed these two incidents not from the perspective of justice but from the perspective of political and economic interests, including transition of conflicts and power afterwards and the following impacts on itself.

3.2.2 THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense is an American anti-ballistic missile defense system designed to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.⁵⁷ In October of 2013, South

⁵⁵ Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: the Northeast Asian response to North Korea's provocations," *The Rusi Journal*, Vol.156, No.2 (April/May 2011), pp.74-77.

⁵⁶ 이동률, 「천안함 사건 이후 미중관계와 한중관계: 중국 외교 전략의 변화를 중심으로」, 제주평화연구원, 『JPI 정책포럼』 (2010년 10월), pp. 7.

⁵⁷ "What is THAAD, what does it do, and why is China mad about it?", *The Diplomat*, February

Korean military asked the United States information about the THAAD as a defense system against North Korean ballistic missiles. On July 8 of 2016, South Korean President Park Geun-hye announced that South Korea and the United States had reached an agreement to deploy the THAAD in South Korea. Following was the serious concern of China about the deployment of the THAAD in the Korean Peninsula, which would become a threat to its own security.

On April 1 of 2016, China and South Korea held a summit conference during the Nuclear Security Summit at Washington.⁵⁸ During the summit, China and South Korea exchanged views on the current situations on the Korean Peninsula, especially on North Korea's fourth nuclear test. Park put emphases on mutual trust and mutual assistance between China and South Korea on the issue of North Korean nuclear tests. Xi stated that every country should restrain from taking actions that could damage security interests and strategic balance of countries located in East Asia, which implicitly targeted at THAAD deployment.

On June 28 and 29 of 2016, during the Davos Forum, Hwang Kyo-ahn, the Prime Minister of South Korea, had meetings with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. It was the first time for Xi to officially raise the issue of the deployment of the THAAD. He stated that "South Korea should pay attention to China's rational security concern and should carefully cope with the issue of THAAD deployment."⁵⁹

On September 5 of 2016, the China-South Korea summit conference was held during the Shanghai G20 meeting, which was the first summit meeting after

25, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/> (Assess Date: 2017/11/10)

⁵⁸ 「习近平会见韩国总统朴槿惠」，外交部，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/t1352414.shtml（检索日：2017年11月10日）

⁵⁹ 「习近平会见韩国国务总理黄教安」，外交部，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/t1376522.shtml（检索日：2017年11月10日）

South Korea's announcement to deploy the THAAD. During the summit, Xi circuitously expressed discomfort about the THAAD issue.⁶⁰ He indirectly stated that the deployment of the THAAD threatened China's core interests and disfigured mutual trust between China and South Korea. He also spoke that China did not want deterioration of the bilateral relationship between China and South Korea with the expression of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences.' This special expression has been used to emphasize cooperation with countries having structural conflicts with China that are difficult to compromise. On the other hand, Park stated that the THAAD is of no need if the North Korean issues are resolved.

After the announcement of the THAAD deployment, China has progressively taken invisible retaliatory measures toward South Korea. China banned K-pop music and South Korean TV shows. It also banned several South Korean products including certain types of air purifier, high-tech toilet seats, and some cosmetics. The Chinese government also demanded travel agencies to stop selling tour packages to South Korea. In addition, the conglomerate group Lotte underwent tax investigations because of its provision of golf courses as the deployment area of the THAAD.

All in all, conflicts between China and South Korea have evolved from non-security issues ("Garlic War" and "Northeast Project") to security issues ("Cheonan/Yeonpyeong Incident" and "THAAD"). This evolution stems from the domestic and international changes of China which lead to shifts in its diplomatic strategy and regarding foreign policies toward South Korea.

⁶⁰ 「习近平会见韩国总统朴槿惠」，外交部，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldr_hd_674881/t1394599.shtml（检索日：2017年11月10日）

IV. Diplomatic Strategy of Xi Jinping's Government

4.1 Background of Xi's Foreign Policy

The mainstream theory of China viewing international politics is realism, which regards the nation-state as the primary actor in international relations, and considers national interests as the embodiment of the nation as a whole.⁶¹ The national interests of China can be concluded as preservation of sovereignty and territory, unification, maintenance of socialist system and ideology, ethnic integration, proliferation of economic interests, and expansion of international influence.⁶² In the same vein, China also lays stress on power politics, which views international politics as essentially a struggle for power.⁶³ Therefore, in the Chinese realpolitik worldview, the international system essentially consists of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power.⁶⁴ This Chinese realpolitik and pragmatic view can be utilized to analyze similarities and differences of Xi's policy toward South Korea comparing with previous administrations'.

4.1.1 External and Internal Factors of China's Foreign-Policy Making

Rise of China (External Factors)

After the 2008-09 financial crisis, there is the power shift in international orders of relative declining of the United States and relative rise of the power of China in the Asia-Pacific region. "Rise of China" denotes that China is evolving from a

⁶¹ Yong Deng, "Conceptions of National Interests: Realpolitik, Liberal Dilemma, and the Possibility of Change", Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), *In the Eye of the Dragon: China Views the World* (Lanham: Bowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 48-50.

⁶² 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, (파주: 나남, 2006), pp. 215.

⁶³ Yong Deng (1999), pp. 53.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

regional power which exercise significant influence in making decisions on political and economic structures as well as rule-making processes of Asia to a global power.⁶⁵

Economically, after the implementation of “Reform and Opening Up” policy, China has achieved brilliant economic success maintaining 9.9% of annual GDP growth from 1978 to 2010. Although it has suffered slight declining of economic growth, China’s annual GDP growth still surpasses 7% after 2010. As a result of such rapid economic growth, in 2010, China has surpassed Japan and become world’s second largest economic entity only after the United States. China has turned into the world market, world investor, and world rule-maker rather than remaining as “world factory”.⁶⁶ After the adoption of “socialist modernization” as Party’s basic principle and decision of promoting “reform” and “opening up”, China has singled out five cities as Special Economic Zones to examine its principle of modernization. Also, in 1986, China has required to join the GATT, and in 2001, it has successfully joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since 2002, China has made its efforts to sign free trade agreements with its principal trading partners. And these efforts have led to the status of world market. China’s foreign-exchange reserves reached US \$3.12 trillion, which was higher than any other nation in the world. This tremendous volume of foreign-exchange reserves has made China to play the role as the world investor, which is accompanied by enlarging political influence. Lastly, China has also been elevated as the world rule-maker, exercising its influence in major international institutions and summits, such as International Monetary Fund, G-

⁶⁵ 조영남 (2012), pp. 59.

⁶⁶ 조영남 (2012), pp. 67.

20, etc.⁶⁷

Militarily, China is currently ranked the third place among 133 countries in terms of Global Fire Power (GFP). China's rise in military power can be indicated by two factors, rapid increase in defense expenditure as well as military modernization. In 2016, the Chinese government official defense spending figure was \$146 billion, an increase of 11% from the budget of \$131 billion two years ago.⁶⁸ This makes China's military budget the second largest in the world behind the US. Rise of China's military power can also be detected in modernization of weapons and enhancement of combat power. After Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he has been pushing through a series of deep reforms in the People's Liberation Army, which is making the army smaller, while the navy and the air force grow.⁶⁹ As for the modernization of weapons, for instance, China's nuclear and missile forces have been recognized as an independent service and have been bolstered with a new array of weapons that push China's potential reach farther out into the Pacific.⁷⁰

In the face of rising China, the US government officially proclaimed a "Pivot to Asia" policy in 2009. According to Hillary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, the pivot strategy would proceed with six courses of action, strengthening bilateral security alliances, deepening America's relationships with rising powers including China, engaging with regional multiple institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing

⁶⁷ 조영남 (2012), pp. 67 – 76.

⁶⁸ "What does China really spend on its military?", China Power, <https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/> (Assess Date: 2017/11/15)

⁶⁹ "Pentagon: Chinese Military Modernization Enters 'New Phase'," Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/pentagon-chinese-military-modernization-enters-new-phase/> (Assess Date: 2017/11/15)

⁷⁰ Ibid.

democracy and human rights.⁷¹ This “pivot” strategy by Obama administration was viewed as a policy targeting rising China, which put stress on the strengthening of the US alliances to contain China. According to Robert S. Ross, the “pivot” towards China unnecessarily amalgamates insecurity of China and will only feed China’s aggressiveness, undermine regional stability, and decrease the possibility of cooperation between China and the United States.⁷² And According to Aaron Friedberg, the “pivot” strategy of the US towards China has coupled engagement with balancing. The engagement half of this strategy has been geared toward enmeshing China in global trade and international institutions, discouraging it from challenging the status quo, and giving it incentives to become a 'responsible stakeholder' in the existing international system.⁷³ The other half is to maintain the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As the main element of the strategy, strengthening security alliance with Japan and South Korea has constantly clashed with China’s own interests. As previously mentioned, the deployment of THHAD was regarded by China as a process of enhancing triangular alliance to check China.

In addition to the conflicts with the United States and its major alliances, with the rise of the power of China, wariness of neighboring states of China has become deepened. And it has been presented as reinforcement of security cooperation, which has collided with China’s national interests as well. For instance, China has South China Sea conflicts with the Philippine and Vietnam, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands conflicts with Japan, and border standoff issues with India. In the face of

⁷¹ “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/> (Assess Date: 2017/11/15)

⁷² Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.91, No.6 (November-December 2012), pp. 72.

⁷³ Aaron Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.91, No.5 (September-October 2012), pp. 49.

the Rising China, the strategic situation in East Asia varies from state to state. Similar with the United States and Japan, India as the most relevant major power follows soft balancing as a response to China's rise. According to structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz, either soft balancing or bandwagoning is the normal response to the situation created by a rising power such as China.⁷⁴ And unlike hard balancing which aims to constrain the rising power by the development of military power, soft balancing refers to the development of political alignments and the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives as a means of constraining the influence of the rising power.⁷⁵ Middle and smaller powers such as South Korea would be less able to pursue soft balancing due to the lack of power and would most probably opt for combination of hedging and accommodation with the power of China.

With such enhancement of power of China, mass media and academic circles are actively discussing whether China is an assertive state or not. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, "assertiveness" means a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before.⁷⁶ Given this definition, China has become more assertive since 2008 and in Xi's administration compared with period of previous administrations. China has shown "assertiveness" in the sphere of "core interests" which includes sovereignty, security, and development. Disputes such as independence movement of Taiwan, South China Sea, and the recent THAAD issue are core interests relating to its sovereignty that directly links to the survival of the CCP regime. Thus, in this regard, China is assertive, and this assertiveness is not a new

⁷⁴ Derek McDougall, "Response to 'Rising China' in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with Accommodation," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.21, No. 73 (January 2012), pp. 3.

⁷⁵ McDougall (2012), pp. 4.

⁷⁶ Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?", *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 10.

one but the degree has become intensive compared with previous administrations owing to its rise of power and the change of strategies of major powers and neighboring countries.

Domestic Situations (Internal Factors)

China's foreign policy is largely determined by domestic and international factors. Domestic factors include the primacy of politics, the weight of the past, and the importance of ideology, and international factors include the foreign policies of the superpowers, the structure of the international system, and China's calculation of its relative power and interests.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, on the whole, China's foreign policy is crucially affected by domestic factors. Namely, China has determined its foreign policy according to CCP's political principles and changes in domestic circumstances, and has modified its diplomatic strategy according to those changes.⁷⁸

The national development strategy and detailed policy of Xi Jinping's administration would not vary much from that of Hu Jintao's administration during the last ten years.⁷⁹ Firstly, the Chinese Communist Party has determined the national strategy which has to be persisted until the year 2020 in the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002. According to the contents of the 16th National Congress, the current objective of China is to build a well-off society in an all-round way with economic as well as political, societal,

⁷⁷ Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 555.

⁷⁸ 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』 (과주: 나남, 2006), pp. 219.

⁷⁹ 조영남, 『중국의 꿈: 시진핑 리더십과 중국의 미래』 (서울: 민음사, 2013), pp. 113.

and cultural development.⁸⁰ Secondly, China's national policy has its own consistency in spite of the shift in leaderships. It is made possible because the former leader and the new leader decide the party policy jointly and the CCP separate succession of power and policy-making. Therefore, in spite of inauguration of the new leadership of Xi, China's national development strategy and detailed policy would have its own consistency.

Yet, in order to confront with the interference of the United States and consolidate political foundation, Xi has implemented political and military reform to achieve his objectives. Firstly, Xi is pushing through a series of deep reforms in the People's Liberation Army, including a massive reorganization of the historically unwieldy institution, moving it from a collection of distinct regional units to a more rigidly top-down organization. He is also purging the military's officer corps and cutting 300,000 troops from the army's bloated ranks. Secondly, in order to make his own diplomatic legacy, Xi has aggressively introduced big projects, such as "One Belt One Road" and "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" which can be viewed as ambitious strategies compared with previous administrations.

4.1.2 Diplomatic Tasks of Xi's Government

After the launch of Xi's administration, China has been faced with at least two crucial diplomatic tasks. The first task is to revise and alter diplomatic policies adjusting to changed external and internal circumstances.⁸¹ Since the year of 1978, China has been insisting on Deng's diplomatic course, "economic diplomacy course," which states that China should construct peaceful and stable

⁸⁰ 조영남 (2013), pp. 115-116.

⁸¹ 조영남, 「시진핑 시대 중국의 외교적 과제와 전망」, 『strategy 21』, 통권 33호 Vol. 17 No.1 (2014년), pp. 7.

international environment beneficial to domestic economic development. Accordingly, China has promoted policies that are beneficial to the maintenance of good relationships with big powers and neighboring countries. In regard to territorial and maritime disputes, China has stuck to Deng's principle of "shelving differences and seeking joint development" to constrain conflicts and enhance mutual cooperation with relating countries. Nevertheless, as mentioned above in the 'external factors,' China has become the second largest economic entity in the world, and accordingly, major big powers and neighboring countries has taken hard stances towards China. Therefore, China has no choice but to seek out new diplomatic policies that can actively respond to such altered circumstances.

According to Younghan Cho, the new diplomatic policies must be the policies that can make international communities acknowledge status and rights of elevated reputation of China.⁸² In this connection, the least condition for China is to protect "core interests," and thus, China must obtain military, economic, and soft power. Also, these new policies must be the policies that can alleviate conflicts with both big powers as well as with neighboring countries. Xi raised a concept of "Chines Dream" in November of 2012, which is an objective of the new administration. And in order to achieve this goal, peaceful and stable surrounding circumstances are needed, which is one of the reasons to succeed existing diplomatic strategies.⁸³

The second task of Xi's administration is to equip itself with efficient diplomatic and security system that can manage new diplomatic policies properly.⁸⁴ After

⁸² 조영남 (2014), pp. 9-10.

⁸³ 习近平, 「共同创造亚洲和世界的美好未来」, 『人民网』, <http://www.people.com.cn/24hour/n/2013/0408/c25408-21047371.html> (检索日: 2017年11月19日)

⁸⁴ 조영남 (2014), pp. 10.

the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, China has shown “assertive” behaviors in foreign diplomacy which was resulted from the lack of mediation between policies of foreign diplomacy and security.⁸⁵ Therefore, the purpose is to strengthen unity of conduct and coordination in the process of making and execution of foreign diplomacy and security policies to overhaul existing system and establish new organizations.

4.2 Successions and Deviations of Xi on Overall Diplomatic Strategy

Diplomatic strategy of China was established systematically and comprehensively after two times of adjustment in the early 1980s and early 1990s.⁸⁶ China’s diplomatic strategy has been rehabilitated progressively in the early and mid-1990s, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, and in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 as mentioned in the previous part. Current diplomatic strategy of China has been put on during early and mid-1990s after the breakout of the Tiananmen Incident and collapse of the Soviet Union. Being a “responsible big power” has been accentuated after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, and change in balance of power between China and the United States after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has brought about the discussion of “assertive China”.

4.2.1 Successions of Xi’s Diplomatic Strategy

Diplomatic Strategy of Xi Jinping’s government contains ambivalence that consists of both successions and deviations from previous administrations. About successions of diplomatic strategy from previous administrations, they are fundamentally awareness of state of affairs, diplomatic objectives, and foreign

⁸⁵ 조영남 (2013), pp. 234-239.

⁸⁶ 조영남 (2006), pp. 262.

policies towards big powers, neighboring states, developing states, multilateral diplomacy and other domains.

As for the awareness of international circumstances and diplomatic goals, China made a judgment that “peace and development” are two major themes of the era and there is low possibility for major powers to be at war and thus international circumstances are friendly for China to develop its economy.⁸⁷ This judgment lasts since 1980s, which is the official judgment of Chinese Communist Party for international circumstances.⁸⁸ In addition, judgment that multi-polarization of international order and globalization of world economy are enduring has been added in the 18th National Congress of the CCP. Also, China is pursuing two major diplomatic goals which are constructing peaceful and stable international environment that is beneficial to domestic economic development and blocking the containment policy of the United States and improving its international influence.⁸⁹ In order to achieve these two major goals, China has actively conducted diplomatic policies toward superpowers, neighboring states, and multilateral institutions, and this diplomatic course will last for a fairly long time.⁹⁰ The foreign policies towards five different domains have also been similar with orders and contents in the political report of previous National Congress. According to the contents of the 18th National Congress, China will proceed with detailed policies of these five domains under the course of “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”.

Firstly, China will build a “new type of great power relations” that will develop

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ 조영남 (2013), pp. 293.

⁸⁹ 조영남 (2006), pp. 262.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

stably and healthily via expanding cooperative domains and properly handle differences with big powers. Secondly, China will strengthen its relationship and regional cooperation with peripheral states under the principle of building a good-neighborly relationship and partnership with its neighbors, and will promote policies of which development of China benefits neighboring countries. Thirdly, China will also reinforce cooperation with developing countries and support their representativeness and voice in international affairs and become a permanently reliable friend as well as true companion of those developing countries. Fourthly, China will actively participate in regional and international multilateral institutions to drive international order and system progress in a fair and reasonable direction. Lastly, China will promote public diplomacy and cultural exchange steadily and will maintain and protect China's overseas legitimate rights and interests.⁹¹

4.2.2 Deviations of Xi's diplomatic strategy

Although the basic line of diplomatic policy of China has not officially changed during the last few years, there has been the slight fine-tuning in its policy.⁹²

For instance, China's core interests were stipulated in the 18th National Congress. Therefore, expression of "core interests" which are "sovereignty, security, and development" instead of "Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region" is in the process of settling down. Also, the "new type of great power relations" which was come up with as the relationship with the United States began to apply to the whole big powers. And the establishment of "maritime power" was fixed as the official policy and the Congress came up with a new expression to rationalize the reinforcement of military power.

4.2.2.1 "Major-Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics"

More concretely, there are three characteristics in Xi Jinping administration's diplomatic strategy that deviate from previous administrations. To establish

⁹¹ 胡锦涛, 「坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进」, pp. 44-45.

⁹² 조영남 (2006), pp. 317-318.

“major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” is the first characteristic of Xi Jinping’s diplomatic strategy, which was put forward in the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs on November 28-29, 2014. After raising the concept of a “responsible major power” by Jiang Zemin, which reflects soared international status of China after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, the identity and role as a major power has become the controversial issue around nature and direction of China’s foreign diplomacy. Xi’s proposal of “major power diplomacy” means changeover of China’s diplomatic course, and it is a new concept generalizing the diplomatic strategy of Xi’s administration.

The “major power diplomacy” has two meanings, one is to deal with big powers such as the United States and Russia, and the other concerns China’s self-identification as a big power in world affairs, which is a more significant notion of Chinese foreign relations.⁹³ The traits of this new concept include “upholding socialism and the CCP leadership, an independent foreign policy of peace, non-interference of internal affairs of others, peaceful coexistence, reason and justice, and the reform of policies.”⁹⁴ Although these traits have marked the characteristics of foreign policy of China for several decades, what’s new is that “it places an unprecedented emphasis on the pursuit of a ‘new type of international relations’ centered on a positive sum approach to every type of international activities.”⁹⁵ Also, Xi demonstrated in the Conference that China should insist on an independent foreign policy of peace while defending its core

⁹³ Weixing Hu, “Xi Jinping’s ‘Big Power Diplomacy’ and China’s Central National Security Commission (CNSC),” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 25, No. 98 (March 2016), pp. 165-166.

⁹⁴ Michael D. Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major-power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” *China Leadership Monitor* No.46 (Winter 2015), pp. 13.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

interests and promote democratization of international relations.⁹⁶ In addition, he states that China should also pursue taking “overall approach to national security” to build a community of a shared destiny with other countries that proceeds with objectives of mutual benefits and joint development. Specific policies of this diplomatic strategy comprises diplomacy with neighboring countries, major powers, and developing countries, multilateral diplomacy, “One Belt One Road”, and overseas assistance. Among these policies, Xi addressed the significance of relations with neighboring states even before the major powers and the importance of the project of “One Belt One Road”.

Overall, the “major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” reflects China’s intentions to secure international status and perform a role befitting its increased national power. It also indicates shifts from “adjustment to existing system” to “search for a new system” that embodies ideology and values with Chinese characteristics. “Major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” specifies intentions of China to affect international orders and make its own voice instead of merely learning and abiding by the international orders.⁹⁷

4.2.2.2 Emphases on “Core Interests”

To clarify regulations on “core interests” is the second characteristic of Xi Jinping’s diplomatic strategy. China’s core interests have been modified from a term roughly refers to “Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” to “sovereignty, security, and development” in the 17th National Congress of CCP in 2007, which was a flexible shift from regions to articles. Since 2000s, China’s regulations on “core interests” have continuously been altered. There have been

⁹⁶ 「中央外事工作会议在北京举行 习近平发表重要讲话」, 『人民网』, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1130/c64094-26119225.html> (检索日: 2017年11月20日)

⁹⁷ 김재철, 「세계 속의 ‘중국식’ 강대국 외교: 시진핑 체제의 외교정책에 대한 평가」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2015 중국정세보고』 (2016. 3), pp. 131.

no words to describe regulations on core interests in the political report of the 16th National Congress.⁹⁸ In the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007, core interests have been brought up in the political report. In the clause of diplomacy, the terms of “national sovereignty, security, and interests of national development”, while in national defense, “national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity” were cited.⁹⁹ And in the 11th meeting for Chinese diplomats of 2009, President Hu Jintao reinforced protection of “national sovereignty, security, and interests of national development”, which was the repetition of the regulations on core interests of 17th National Congress.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, core interests of China have been clarified in a more comprehensive way in the whitepaper of “China’s Peaceful Development 2011”, which was an expansion of the regulations of 17th National Congress. According to the whitepaper, China’s core interests include “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development”.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the 18th National Congress is a turning back to the 17th National Congress in terms of core interests, and regulations on core interests have become more specific through these two national congresses. In the political report of the 18th National Congress of 2012, there has been two expressions brought up on core interests. One is the “national sovereignty, security, and interests of national development” in the

⁹⁸ 江泽民,「全面建设小康社会,开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面」(2002. 11),新华月报 编,『十六大以来党和国家重要文献选编(上-1)』(北京:人民出版社,2005), pp. 33-39.

⁹⁹ 胡锦涛,「高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜,为夺取全面建设小康社会新胜利而奋斗」(2007. 10),中共中央文献研究室 编,『十七大以来重要文献选编(上)』(北京:中央文献出版社,2009), pp. 32, 36.

¹⁰⁰ 胡锦涛,「我国改革发展稳定面临新的机遇和挑战」,『人民日报』, 2009年 7月 21日.

¹⁰¹ 中华人民共和国 国务院 新闻办公室,『2011年中国政府白皮书汇编』(北京:人民出版社, 2011), pp. 178.

clause of diplomacy, and the other one is “national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and peaceful development” in the clause of national defense.

Establishment of Integrated Security Organizations

To defend these core interests, Xi has taken several new measurements with a more proactive approach to China’s foreign relations which deviate from his predecessors’, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin’s relatively conservative stances handling international affairs and Deng Xiaoping’s “Tao Guang Yang Hui (keep a low profile)”.¹⁰² The first measurement is to newly establish integrated security organizations, Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and Central Leading Group for Cyber-Security and Information, to refine overall architecture of foreign and security policymaking institutions. On the one hand, China needs an integrated organization to defend its national interests in world affairs in order to promote “major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.” With continuously growing national power and its rising international status, China is facing a more complicated and comprehensive security environment compared with eras of previous administrations.¹⁰³ Yet, the current Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs and Central Leading Group for National Security Affairs lack accountability and ability to respond to challenges and problems.

Besides, the present Chinese foreign and security policymaking suffers from inefficiency, a lack of coordination and information sharing, and accountability of decision makers caused by fragmented authoritarianism in the Chinese political system.¹⁰⁴ In theory, according to Hu Angang, “coordination between different government and organization occurs through communication and

¹⁰² Hu (2016), pp. 164-166.

¹⁰³ 조영남 (2014), pp. 25

¹⁰⁴ Hu (2016), pp. 169.

consultation of individual SCPB (Standing Committee of Political Bureau, the ultimate decision-making power) members, which is inter-organization and intra-organization information sharing.”¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, in practice, decision-making authority at the top is delegated and divided into a number of Central Leading Groups (CLG), which is a unique feature of CCP’s decision-making practice.¹⁰⁶ According to Weixing Hu, “the central leading groups are formed in line with tasks and areas of functions, and they serve as the overall coordinator of certain sectors of government functions over their respective policy spheres, and they are designed to perform a wide variety of tasks to lessen the workload of SCPB.”¹⁰⁷ However, the foreign and security affairs are usually complicated and intertwined over several areas of functions, this institutional architecture of decision-making has resulted in fragmentations. This is one of the motives for Xi to reorganize and overhaul the institutional architecture of decision-making authority on foreign and security affairs.

The establishment of Central National Security Commission (CNSC) was decided during the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, and its organizational structure was completed in the Political Bureau Congress of CCP in January 2014. According to the Congress, Xi Jinping was appointed as the chairman, Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council, and Zhang Dejiang, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, as the deputy heads.¹⁰⁸ The Party laid a high weight on the organization which can be ascertained from its composition, top three leaders of the CCP in charge of its head positions. Other than the chairman and deputy heads, its general members

¹⁰⁵ Hu Angang, “Collective Leadership, China’s Way”, *Beijing Review* 37 (2013), pp. 28-29.

¹⁰⁶ Hu (2016), pp. 170.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Hu (2016), pp. 174.

have yet to be released to the public.

As for the nature of the CNSC, the Political Bureau stipulated it as “an organization making overall plans and coordinating major issues and work concerning national security.”¹⁰⁹ Additionally, with the decision to make it as a high-rank organization of the CCP not a state agency has placed it directly under management of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. CNSC’s missions and functions can be articulated based on its nature and status, which are

“organizing and conducting research on major national security issues and formulating a national security strategy for the country, becoming a national decision making and command structure in the Chinese political system, strengthening China’s crisis management capability and responding to emergency situations more swiftly, and solving other major issues in national security in addition to strategic planning and formulating national security strategy.”¹¹⁰

Promotion of “Great Maritime Power”

Second measurement for Xi to defend nation’s core interests is to build China into a “great maritime power.” The decision to promote the strategy of “building a great maritime power” was set forth during the 18th National Congress of the CCP in November 2012. In July 30th of 2013, during the 8th Collective Study of the Central Political Bureau, Xi demonstrated several critical points on the strategy of the “great maritime power.” Xi stressed that “China is a land power as well as a maritime power which is in possession of a wide range of maritime strategic interests.”¹¹¹ To build a great maritime power, China needs to make

¹⁰⁹ 조영남 (2014), pp. 25.

¹¹⁰ Hu (2016), pp. 175-176.

¹¹¹ 「进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略 推动海洋强国建设不断取得新成就」, 『新华网』,

efforts in following four areas, “enhancing the ability of exploiting ocean resources, protecting ecological environment of the ocean, developing advanced technology of the ocean, and defending maritime sovereignty, rights and interests.” Among these four efforts, in order to achieve the fourth one, “safeguarding maritime sovereignty and rights”, Xi has put forward several policies that need to be adhered to.

Firstly, While China insists on the path of peaceful development, it cannot abandon the ‘justifiable rights and interests’ and cannot sacrifice its ‘core interests’ of ‘sovereignty, security and development.’ Secondly, China should insist on principles of solving maritime disputes via peaceful and conversational means to maintain peace and stability. Along with that, China will enhance its ability to safeguard maritime rights in facing complicated circumstances, and it should protect its maritime rights indomitably. Last but not least, on maritime disputes, China should stick to the principle of ‘shelving differences, and seeking joint development’ but on the condition that ‘sovereignty belongs to China’ to promote mutual benefits and friendly cooperation and to discover and extend convergence point of common interests.¹¹²

Among these three points, the last point reflects the fact that Xi has deviated from his predecessors over maritime disputes. Before Xi came to the office, Chinese governments have insisted on Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “shelving differences and seeking joint development.” Nevertheless, the conservatives claim that Deng’s principle is way too soft and China should adopt the principle of “sovereignty belongs to China” as well.¹¹³ And the contents of 8th Collective Study of the Central Political Bureau explicitly show Xi’s alterations of the principles.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/31/c_116762285.htm (检索日: 2017年11月24日)

¹¹² 조영남 (2014), pp. 17.

¹¹³ 조영남 (2013), pp. 284.

Concerning maritime territorial disputes, China has been specifying the regarding strategies after Xi came to power. According to 박창희, it seems that China has awakened to regard territorial disputes with neighboring countries as opportunities to gain leverage in international political arena.¹¹⁴ Therefore, accordingly, China's strategies concerning maritime territorial disputes have been gradually polished exquisitely.

According to 박창희, China's strategies can be summed up into three detailed strategies, "piecemeal strategy", "ignorance strategy", and "interdiction strategy". "Piecemeal strategy" is a strategy that turning the status quo of East China Sea and South China Sea slowly and gradually into favorable situations to China. "Piecemeal strategy" seems to be on the same orbit with "postponement strategy" of Deng. However, "piecemeal strategy" is distinctly different since it changes the status quo via progressively eating into others' territory and interests and actualizing the changes in the end. China has applied this strategy to East China Sea's ADIZ, South China Sea's artificial islands, and oil drilling in Vietnam's EEZ. China announced air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea with new air traffic restrictions in November 2013. And China has been piling sand onto reefs in the South China Sea to secure permanent bases since October 2014. Moreover, in May 2014, China pushed ahead with oil drilling in mining areas of Vietnam's exclusive economic zone despite the previous accord with Vietnam to jointly develop oil and gas fields in the South China Sea.

"Ignorance strategy" is a strategy of China that ignoring other countries' efforts of territorial claims via putting forth its own territorial claims as reasonable ones. One of the instances is the ignorance of ruling of UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal on maritime disputes over the South China Sea with the Philippines. About the

¹¹⁴ 박창희, 「중국의 영토분쟁 정책: 핵심이익을 넘어서?」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2014 중국정세보고』 (2015. 3), pp. 373-374.

disputes, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China declared that China would neither accept the case for arbitration nor participate in the judgmental process, and further stated that UNCLOS legally has no jurisdiction.¹¹⁵

“Interdiction strategy” is a strategy for China to prevent the interference of the third country over its maritime territorial disputes. Vietnam and the Philippines have made efforts to arouse the attention of international community to the disputes over the South China Sea, and tried to get the United States involved in the disputes. Yet, China stated that intervention of the third country would ignite competition among major powers which would result in deterioration of current situations.¹¹⁶ Currently, while the United States adheres to its neutrality on South China Sea disputes, it progressively raises its degree of interference. And accordingly, China has kept strengthening the solidarity with Russia in response to the deterioration of the East and South China Sea disputes as well as the consolidation of the alliance between the United States and Japan.

Reform of People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

Third measurement for Xi to defend nation’s core interests is to reorganize People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to You Ji, PLA’s role in China’s foreign policy making is to “abide by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in managing Beijing’s international pursuits.”¹¹⁷ And as a role of command and control of the PLA, Central Military Commission of the CCP (CMC) is responsible for “security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the

¹¹⁵ 「中华人民共和国政府关于菲律宾共和国所提南海仲裁案管辖权问题的立场文件」, 中华人民共和国外交部, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1217143.shtml (检索日: 2017年11月25日)

¹¹⁶ 박창희 (2015), pp. 365–366.

¹¹⁷ You Ji, “The PLA and Diplomacy: unraveling myths about the military rule in foreign policy making,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 23 No. 86 (2014), pp. 237.

bottom-line for employing force in conflicts.” After Xi took power, he has driven a rather radical military reform on the PLA and CMC.

As stated in the whitepaper of “China’s Military Strategy” of 2015, China’s overall military strategy has shifted from ‘military strategic guideline of active defense of the new era’ to ‘military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation’. This shift demonstrates that China’s military strategy has transferred from strategies focusing on time-period to strategies going around security situations. Here the ‘new situation’ emphasizes that the possibility of military threats of the United States and Japan to violate China’s core interests becomes higher.¹¹⁸ Therefore, under this ‘new situation’, it is necessary for China to strengthen its military power and implement active defense strategy to realize the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

There are several motives for Xi to carry out military reform. Firstly, it is necessary for China to raise the efficiency of command and control via streamlining the PLA personnel.¹¹⁹ The organization of Chinese military is by far bulky and the duties of each departments are overlapping which have resulted in the decrease of efficiency. Second motive is to reinforce and improve joint operational capabilities between services and branches. Although China has made efforts to strengthen the ability of joint operations’ performing in modernized battlefields, there has been limits in conducting combined actions under current chain of command. To establish military posture that can immediately respond to conflicts and wars happening around its territory is the third motive of Xi to conduct military reform. Under the new military strategy of ‘military strategic

¹¹⁸ 박창희, 「2015년 중국 군사: 신국사전략 방침과 전략적 군사력 증강」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2015 중국정세보고』 (2016. 3), pp. 363.

¹¹⁹ 박창희, 「2016년 중국의 군사: 국방개혁을 중심으로」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2016 중국정세보고』 (2017. 3), pp. 101.

guideline of active defense in the new situation,' this motive can be understood as wariness of China to prepare beforehand to check the US's consolidation of its alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, its enforcement of military capacity in this region, and its interference in maritime territorial conflicts. The last motive is to reestablish the relationship between military and party to strengthen the superior status of the Party. Since Mao Zedong's era, 'Party's absolute leadership over the army' is the principle needed to be obeyed. Yet, it seems that Chinese Army has not make enough efforts to follow the decisions of the Party to modernize military and defense in recent years. Therefore, Xi is urgent to reestablish the relationship between military and party through the military reform.

The actions that Xi has taken to conduct military reform are as follows.¹²⁰ During the Victory Day parade on September 3rd of 2015, Xi declared a reduction of 300,000 PLA personnel, cutting the size of the PLA personnel down to 2,000,000. This decision was aimed to enhance the advanced military technology and joint operational capabilities among services, and to send the message to the world that China will not be a threat to the regional stability. After this proclamation, a series of following actions has been taken by Xi.

Firstly, in January of 2016, reorganization of the CMC was announced. The new CMC organization consists of seven departments, three commissions, and five offices instead of previous four headquarters which includes the General Staff, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Equipment Department. This reorganization of the CMC intends to strengthen the power of Chairman Xi and to raise the efficiency among each department.

Secondly, on December 31st of 2015, Xi announced the establishment of the PLA

¹²⁰ 박창희 (2017), pp. 104-109.

Army's leading organ, the PLA Rocket Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force. The establishment of PLAA's leading organ denotes a decline in status of the PLA Army since Xi has transferred the focus of the military strategy from the land to the ocean to build China as a strong maritime power. The PLA Rocket Force is the former Second Artillery Force which shows the volition of China to cope with the US and Japan's enhancement of missile defense system and competition over nuclear weapons with the US. The PLA Strategic Support Force is a 'new type of operational capability' that takes charge of information, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, defense of internet attack, and psychological warfare. Alongside this new establishment, China has accomplished five-full-service system that consists of PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and abovementioned three new services.

Thirdly, in February of 2016, five theater commands which include the Eastern, Western, Southern, Northern, and Central theater commands, replaced former seven military commands. Xi declared that "The duty of new theater commands is to respond to security threats, maintaining peaceful status quo, containing warfare and winning in the battlefields, and stabilizing overall situations of national security strategy as well as military strategy."¹²¹ Compared with previous military commands, new theater commands have no military power but only jurisdictions over combatant command.

Last but not least, the command and control system has also changed into a binary system. Military orders (*junling*) start from the Joint Operational Command Agency of the CMC, then pass to the five theater commands, and then to the subordinate units. And military power (*junzheng*) starts from the CMC, then to

¹²¹ Zhang Tao, "President Xi announces Establishment of PLA Theater Commands," *China Military Online*, February 1 of 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/01/content_6884069.htm. (Assess Date: 2017/12/13)

five military services, and then to the subordinate units.

Xi, as a more decisive and strong military leader compared with his predecessors, conducts groundbreaking military reforms, which is a distinctive characteristic of his leadership. Although this military reform of Xi needs plenty of time to be accomplished, according to Tai Ming Cheung, “Xi has moved quickly to promote his vision of the central role military power plays in China’s rise as a great power through his promotion of a ‘strong China dream’ that goes hand in hand with a ‘strong military dream’”.¹²²

4.2.2.3 New “Peripheral Diplomacy”

To carry out new “peripheral diplomacy” is the third characteristic of Xi Jinping’s diplomatic strategy. On October 24th and 25th of 2015, China held a work forum on Chinese diplomacy toward the periphery, which was the first conference that set ‘peripheral diplomacy’ as the subject.¹²³ On coming into power, Xi proclaimed significance of “peripheral diplomacy”, saying that “periphery is of the first importance, major powers are the key, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateralism is the crucial stage.”¹²⁴ This denotes that Xi put more emphases on the periphery compared with previous administrations. There are roughly two reasons for the CCP to hold such a work forum.¹²⁵ The most significant goal is to ease the anxiety of neighboring countries, which is aroused by the impression of assertiveness of China and Xi’s administration on account

¹²² Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military Commission in the Twenty-first Century,” Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds.), *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 111

¹²³ 「习近平在周边外交工作座谈会上发表重要讲话」,『新华网』, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm (检索日: 2017年12月21日)

¹²⁴ 麦纳,「习近平命运共同体战略力克安倍价值观外交」,『多维新闻网』, <http://news.dwnews.com/global/big5/news/2013-10-26/59341074.html> (检索日: 2017年12月21日)

¹²⁵ 조영남 (2014), pp. 23-24.

of underscore on the defending of core interests, building maritime power, and reinforcing military power. The other intention is to resolve confusion and conflicts over policies among departments through keeping uniformity and mediating policies during the work forum.

In the work forum, Xi roughly pointed out two strategic goals of the peripheral diplomacy. The first one is to develop relationships with peripheral countries comprehensively, strengthen good-neighborliness and friendliness, and develop cooperation which can serve and contribute to achievement of “two centenary goals” and great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The second one is to defend the “core interests” of ‘sovereignty, security, and development.’ This second strategic goal is the distinctive characteristics of Xi which is different with his predecessors. More concretely, there are four specific objectives of the peripheral diplomacy, which are “to make political relationships with peripheral countries friendlier, to enhance economic ties, to deepen security cooperation, and to build intimate humanistic linkage.”

The basic policy of the peripheral diplomacy that Xi declared contains both the old and the new.¹²⁶ The old is that the policy insists on “building friendship and partnership with neighboring counties.” The new is that the policy embodies “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness.” In addition, Xi brought up certain principles on the “peripheral diplomacy,” which are “maintaining regional peace and stability, devoting to regional economic integration via establishment of the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,’ promoting regional security cooperation based on the ‘New Security Concept,’ and pushing ahead the concept of ‘community of shared destiny’ through humanistic exchanges, etc.” In regard to the principles, the old is the insistence

¹²⁶ 조영남 (2014), pp. 22-23.

on Deng's course of diplomacy of constructing peaceful and stable surrounding environment. On the other hand, the new is the presentation of the concept of 'community of shared destiny' which is a response to the US and Japan's community-oriented 'creating shared value'.

Overall, China's diplomatic policy has its own consistency but there has been the slight fine-tuning in its policy of every administration, and it applies to Xi's administration as well.

V. Xi Jinping Government's Foreign Policy toward South Korea

China's policy toward South Korea is decided by two major diplomatic goals which are "constructing peaceful and stable international environment that is beneficial to domestic economic development" and "blocking the containment policy of the United States and improving its international influence."¹²⁷ China's long-term strategic goals in the Korean Peninsula are non-US military presence and non-pro-Japan stance.¹²⁸ And China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula is based on a maxi-mini bargaining strategy maximizing China's national interests while minimizing the economic and security costs of winning both international accord and domestic ratification.¹²⁹

Based on the strategic goals and strategy, China's diplomatic goals toward the Korean Peninsula are as follows.¹³⁰ The prior task is to maintain stable and peaceful situation of Korean Peninsula, which leads to the objection to North Korea's nuclear armament and unification of the Korean Peninsula. Second one is to maintain the North Korean regime which could act as a buffer zone to shelter direct military confrontation with the United States. Third one is to strengthen the relationships with South Korea which can prevent the US-Japan-South Korea triangular alliances from implementing containment policy toward China. Thus, to achieve these goals, China has been promoting equi-distance policy towards North and South Korea.

In one word, China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula and South Korea also has its own consistency. Yet, owing to the power shifts in international orders of

¹²⁷ 조영남 (2006), pp. 257.

¹²⁸ You Ji (2001), pp. 396.

¹²⁹ Samuel S. Kim (2001), pp. 405.

¹³⁰ 조영남 (2006), pp. 257-258.

relative declining of the United States and relative rise of the power of China in the Asia-Pacific region after the 2008-09 financial crisis as well as the political and military reform of Xi's administration, China's policy toward South Korea under Xi's administration has become **more assertive** on issues related to its core interests compared with previous administrations.

5.1 China's Stance and Policies toward Park's Government

After the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, China has converted the guiding principle of foreign affairs from Deng's "Tao Guang Yang Hui (to keep a low profile)" to a more conative diplomacy of "You Suo Zuo Wei (to make positive contributions)" under Xi's administration. During Hu's administration, China's foreign policy has been focused on maintenance of stability and status quo with self-identity as a "developing country," which is a strategy of non-intervention in international affairs that are over its own capability. Yet, Xi has been making efforts to defend China's core interests and enhance its military power, political influence on international stage, and international status based on the self-recognition as a "big power." Accordingly, Xi has actively proposed new paradigm of international relations such as the principle of "major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" for relationships with major big powers, especially the United States.

Along with the shift of paradigm of its foreign policy, China has also been restructuring its strategy towards the Korean Peninsula. According to Heungkyu Kim, there are three aspects of implication on the new paradigm of China's relationship with the United States and its new policies towards the Korean Peninsula.¹³¹ Firstly, issues of the Korean Peninsula has turned into a touchstone

¹³¹ 김홍규, 「시진핑시기 중국의 대한반도 정책과 박근혜 대통령 방중의 의의」, 한국전략문제연구소, 『전략연구』 (2013.07), pp. 204-205.

of new major power relations between China and the United States. Secondly, China would continue to enhance its relationships with peripheral countries as an end to compete with the United States as consequences of its rising economic and military power and rebalancing strategy of the US. Thirdly, situations of the Korean Peninsula would be maintained. Therefore, it can be denoted that China's foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula has revised as a balanced approach between North and South to enhance China's influence on the Korean Peninsula within the frame of competition with the US rather than solely sticking to Sino-DPRK relationship. Thus, Xi's administration has been promoting its relationship with North Korea as a normal-country relationship and actively presenting diplomatic offensive towards South Korea. And China, under Xi's administration, has been making its efforts to sever the Asia's alliance triangle of US-Japan-South Korea by separating and drawing South Korea from the triangle to enhance its influence on the Korean Peninsula. On May 26 of 2014, the Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated during his visit to South Korea that "China is willing to decide on South Korea as a rather significant cooperative partner, and jointly achieving prosperity and development, maintaining peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, and endorsing Asia's revitalization."¹³²

Under these circumstances, China's stance and policies toward Park Geun-hye's administration under Xi's leadership has deviations compared with previous administrations'. Relationship between Xi's and Park's administration has gone through "politically and economically hot" in the early stage and "politically and economically cold" in the later stage. On July 3 of 2014, Xi Jinping visited South Korea for the first time even before his first visit to North Korea, which is the first case for China's top leader to visit South Korea before North Korea. Wang

¹³² 「王毅：中方愿选择韩国作为今后更重要的合作伙伴」，中华人民共和国驻韩国大使馆，<http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cekor/chn/sgxx/t1160799.htm>（检索日：2017年12月28日）

Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, demonstrated affinity via stating that Xi's visit to South Korea was a drop-around visit between relatives. In November of 2014, China and South Korea held a summit conference in Beijing, which demonstrated a positive approach of China toward South Korea.¹³³ During the summit, China and South Korea reached an agreement on routinizing multilayer channels of dialogue and founding young leaders' forum. In addition, the two states supplemented contents of cooperation on military and security, and the most significant consensus was made on operating demarcation of maritime boundary through negotiations and consultations in 2015. The summit has presented direction and object of Sino-ROK relations on four different facets of partnership, which are bilateral, regional, Asian, and global one. This partnership with South Korea targets at establishment of "New Security system" in Asia and new type of international relationships around the world.

The year 2015 was portrayed as the year of unprecedentedly friendly relations between China and South Korea.¹³⁴ In March, South Korea decided to become a member of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) launched by China. On September 3, South Korea President Park Geun-hye attended the victory parade of 70th anniversary of the end of World War II hosted by China. And on June 1, China and South Korea signed a free trade agreement which went into force on December 20. As regards AIIB, Xi officially expressed his expectation for South Korea to become one of the founding members of AIIB to Park during the summit in July of 2014. The AIIB is an institution to break out of the dollar trap for establishing a regional trading bloc in Eurasia. Such action of China has viewed as its soft-balancing strategy against the US's Pivot to Asia. And inviting South

¹³³ 이동률 (2014), pp. 7-9.

¹³⁴ 이동률, 「2015년 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2015 중국정세보고』 (2016. 3), pp. 213-225.

Korea to become a member of AIIB is also one of China's strategies to weaken the US's alliance power. Therefore, South Korea's decision to join the AIIB has crucial symbolic meanings for the development of Sino-ROK bilateral relationship. Invitation of China to South Korea to take part in the victory parade on September 3 also follows the same logic of AIIB case.

Compared to the "honey-moon" period of 2015, 2016 witnessed Sino-ROK bilateral relationship went down the drain on account of continuous provocation from North Korea and the following response from South Korea to deploy the defense system of THAAD.¹³⁵ South Korea announced the deployment of the THAAD partially because it made a judgement that China could not efficiently perform a role over the North Korean nuclear issues after North Korea conducted the fourth nuclear test. Furthermore, South Korean officials made a phone call with heads of the US's and Japanese government, which China considered as the enhancement of the US-Japan-South Korean triangular alliances. Thus, China expressed concerns and vigilance about the deployment, and interpreted it as consolidation of alliance power among the US, Japan, and South Korea, which China termed a 'little NATO in Asia-Pacific.' The THAAD issue has turned into an incident that has made scratch on diplomatic achievements of Xi, which are the significant groundwork of Xi's administration. Xi has put emphasis of the South Korean policy on not letting South Korea actively participate in the rebalancing strategy and checks-on-China strategy of the US. Yet, China made a judgment that the THAAD issue has crucially violated its core interests and security concerns, and that South Korea's move has enhanced the power of the triangular alliance. Therefore, Xi has kept expressing his warnings and concerns

¹³⁵ 이동률, 「2016년 한중관계: '최상의 관계'가 초래한 역풍」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2016 중국정세보고』, pp. 130-134.

and decided to take economic retaliation on South Korea.

Overall, Xi's stance and policies toward Park Geun-hye's administration have certain deviations compared with his predecessors. Xi has made efforts to sever the Asia's alliance triangle of US-Japan-South Korea by separating and drawing South Korea from the triangle to enhance its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Compared with Hu, Xi has presented diplomatic offensive toward Park's administration, but the THAAD deployment has put brakes on his South Korean strategy.

5.2 THAAD and the US-Japan-South Korean Triangular Alliance

As mentioned in the previous part, after the announcement of Park's administration to deploy the THAAD in South Korea, the Chinese government has taken a series of retaliatory measures towards South Korea. China's economic retaliation has appeared several times before it retaliated on South Korea. In 2010, when China had territorial disputes with Japan over East China Sea, China made an announcement to postpone conferences on coal and suspend negotiations on aerial routes, demanded travel agencies to reduce sales of tour packages to Japan, and banned the exports of rare earth to Japan. In 2012, when China had disputes with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, China prohibited tours of its citizens to the Philippines, exerted stronger control over the agricultural products importing from the Philippines, and banned imports of bananas.

Nevertheless, the case of the THAAD has certain different points compared with the previously mentioned incidents, which is basically a trial of strength between China and the United States. According to Chung Jae-ho, there are roughly three facets of the THAAD that intertwine China with the United States.¹³⁶ Firstly,

¹³⁶ 정재호, 「2016년 미-중 관계의 평가」, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 편, 『2016 중국정세보고』, pp. 91-92.

according to China's point of view, the THAAD deployment would weaken the first strike capability of China which would redistribute the power of nuclear deterrence between China and South Korea. Secondly, as remarked by the Chinese spokesman, THAAD is rather a strategic issue than a technical issue to all related states. Since the year of 2013, China has groundbreaking improvement of relationship with South Korea. Yet, South Korea's decision of the THAAD deployment indicated the reinforcement of triangular alliance as well as the American-led missile defense system, which meant a huge threat to China. Thirdly, China worried about emergence of 'encirclement of China' by other states in the East Asia through constructing missile defense system.

Compared to the circumstances that previous administrations faced, Xi's administration has encountered a rather strongly connected alliances among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. After Shinzo Abe was elected as the Prime Minister, Japan has kept sending messages to the United States that alliances between the two are firm and vital. On November 23 of 2016, Japan and South Korean signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which was viewed as a crucial part of 'Pivot to Asia' strategy of the United States. In addition, the THAAD deployment in South Korea indicated the reinforcement of American-led missile defense system, all of which symbolizes consolidation of the US-Japan-South Korean triangular alliance in the Asia-Pacific, which poses a threat to China's security and development.

Also, after Xi took power, he has clarified regulations on the core interests, which include 'sovereignty, security, and development.' And to defend these core interests, Xi has established integrated security organizations and driven a rather radical military reform on the PLA and CMC. Yet, the announcement of the THAAD deployment threatened China's core interests and aroused backlash from the PLA. In addition, the THAAD deployment has made scratch on diplomatic achievements of Xi, which are the significant groundwork of Xi's

administration. Therefore, the combination of the external and internal circumstances led Xi's administration to take more assertive measurements on the THAAD issue than the previous administrations.

5.3 North Korean Nuclear Issues

Deviations of Xi from previous administrations can also be denoted from his policy over nuclear-armed North Korea. Since the conclusion of the "Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961," China and North Korea has become inseparable relations. Yet, North Korean nuclear issues have become a tremendous hindrance for their intimate relationships. Until now, North Korea has conducted six times of nuclear tests. Among these nuclear tests, the first two tests were conducted during Hu's regime, and the last four were carried out during the first five years of Xi's tenure.

The first two nuclear tests of North Korea were in 2006 and 2009. On October 9, 2006, North Korea exploded around 1,000 tons of TNT, which aroused condemnation of international community. Immediately after the nuclear test, spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of China stated that "the DPRK ignored universal opposition and once more conducted the nuclear test, thus the Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it."¹³⁷ At the same time, the spokesman called for "a calm response from all parties that concerned and urged them to pursue peaceful resolution of the issue through consultation and dialogue." These official remarks demonstrate China's stance of criticism and peaceful problem solving over North Korean nuclear armament. After the first North Korean nuclear test happened, the UN Security Council announced 'Resolution 1718' which stated that "North Korea should not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile," and "North Korea should return to the Treaty on the

¹³⁷ "Chinese gov't 'resolutely opposes' DPRK's nuclear test," China Embassy, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t564379.htm> (Asses Date: 2017/12/30)

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” Regarding the member states of UN Security Council, the Resolution required them to “prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to North Korea of any items which could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs.”¹³⁸ China only agreed to the ‘Resolution 1718’ after removing requirements for tough economic sanctions, with conditions of peaceful resolution through dialogues and negotiations. However, China did not take actions to inspect cargo to and from North Korea, and there was a high frequency of exchanges of high-ranking officials between the two countries. In addition, volume of bilateral trade between China and North Korea continued to increase after the first North Korean nuclear test and the announcement of the UNSC Resolution, from 1.70 billion US dollars in 2006 to 1.97 billion US dollars in 2007.

The second North Korean nuclear test was on May 25 of 2009 after the declaration of its left from the Six Party Talks. China’s official position was similar to the first one with more emphases on peaceful negotiations and dialogues than harsh economic sanctions on North Korea. China’s ambassador to UN at that time, Zhang Yesui stated that “the Resolution should not influence North Korea’s national development and humanitarian assistance to it in a reversed way.” Equally, there were also high-level exchanges of officials between China and North Korea, and the volume of bilateral trade augmented from 2.68 billion US dollars in 2009 to 3.47 billion US dollars in 2010. Obviously, remarks made by the Chinese officials on North Korean nuclear tests appeared to be merely diplomatic rhetoric during Hu’s administration since there were no serious

¹³⁸ The United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1718,” <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement> (Asses Date: 2017/12/30)

actions and sanctions taken afterwards.

The recent four times of nuclear tests of North Korea were successively on February 12 of 2013, January 6 of 2016, September 9 of 2016, and September 3 of 2017, which was a perceptibly higher frequency compared to Hu's administration. On February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted much larger nuclear experiments after Kim Jung-un took power. Again, the UN Security Council adopted 'Resolution 2087,' which stated that "North Korea should immediately comply fully with obligations under resolution 1718 and 1874," and all member states should implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 and 1874."¹³⁹ Additionally, the UN Security Council permitted sanctions against North Korean diplomats, and it also imposed asset freeze and travel bans on military-related individuals and firms. China, under Xi's administration, while stuck to the principles of denuclearization on Korean Peninsula and solving problems through dialogues, it agreed to the UNSC resolution with expanded and strengthened sanctions compared to Hu's administration. Xi's government, after the release of the 'Resolution 2094' by the UNSC, which enhanced the degree of sanctions implemented by other states, decided on a hardline policy toward North Korea. Yang Jiechi, the Foreign Minister of China, demonstrated that "China was strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed to the test and urged North Korea to stop any rhetoric and actions that could worsen situations and return to the right course of dialogue and consultation as soon as possible."¹⁴⁰ The Chinese government commanded several authorities, such as the Maritime Safety Administration and the Ministry of Transport to firmly carry out provisions in the

¹³⁹ The United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2087," http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2087%282013%29 (Asses Date: 2017/12/30)

¹⁴⁰ Davis Chance, Jack Kim, "North Korean nuclear test draws anger, including from China," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north/north-korean-nuclear-test-draws-anger-including-from-china-idUSBRE91B04820130212> (Assess Date: 2017/12/30)

‘Resolution 2094.’ The Chinese customs also enhanced clearance inspections in harbors and national boundaries of the areas of trade with North Korea. The Chinese financial authorities began to inspect bank branches of North Korea located in China doing businesses without permission and limited transactions from and to North Korea. In addition, the meetings of officials between China and North Korea decreased markedly, and after the inauguration, Xi visited South Korea before his visit to North Korea. China has progressively heightened degree of sanctions after the fourth, fifth, and sixth North Korean nuclear tests. On January 5 of 2018, the Ministry of Commerce of China announced to put limitations on oil supply to North Korea and ban steel exports towards North Korea, which were based on the ‘Resolution 2397’ by the UNSC.

With its major diplomatic goals of constructing peaceful and stable international environment beneficial to domestic economic development, the big frame of China’s foreign policy toward North Korea has been unchanged. The prior task is to maintain the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula so that China can maintain its own stability within its territory. Hu’s administration defined its relationship with North Korea as “new type of friendship,” and proposed new tone of “new way, new thinking, and new channel” for the development of bilateral relations.¹⁴¹ When Hu visited North Korea in October 2005, he suggested four schemes of bilateral cooperation between China and North Korea, which were “to strengthen meditation of policies through sustained high-level exchanges, to enhance contents of cooperation through expanding domains of cooperation, to achieve joint development through economic exchanges, and to protect common interests through mutual cooperation.” During Hu’s administration, China has enhanced bilateral cooperation with North Korea based

¹⁴¹ 이계란, 「후진타오 정부의 대북정책: 북핵문제를 중심으로」, 『한국과 국제정치 (KWP)』, 22권 0호 (2010년), pp. 152-169.

on the principles of protecting national interests and the bilateral relationship has evolved from “special relationship” to “strategic relationship” via emphasizing Party-to-Party exchanges.

Regarding North Korean nuclear tests, Hu’s administration confronted policy dilemma between regional disturbance and a nuclear-armed North Korea. To overcome the North Korean nuclear issues and protect its own national interests, the most feasible way for China is to persuade North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons and implement economic reforms to maximize values of North Korea as an alliance. Thus, Hu’s administration has made its efforts to resolve the issues via negotiations and dialogues on the table of Six Party Talks rather than heightening its degree of economic sanctions.

While conforming to the policies set by previous administrations, Xi’s policies toward the issues have slight distinctions from Hu’s. On the 18th National Congress of the CCP, Xi Jinping proposed the “Two Centenary Goals,” which are “to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by the time the Communist Party of China celebrates its centenary in 2021,” and “to turn China into a modern socialist country and realize the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by the time the Republic of China celebrates its centenary in 2049.”¹⁴² To achieve these two goals, Xi put forward “major-power diplomacy,” “new peripheral diplomacy,” “one belt one road,” and other policies. And these newly-proposed policies have exerted great impact on neighboring states including the Korean Peninsula. After Xi took power, China’s tactical responses towards North Korea have become cautious and assertive. China’s economic sanctions on North Korea have become more intensified, and there have been less exchanges of high-level officials between the two countries

¹⁴² 「习近平在十八届中央纪委二次全会上发表重要讲话」,『新华网』, <http://news.cntv.cn/2013/01/23/ARTI1358888136269253.shtml> (检索日: 2017年12月30日)

and more criticisms about North Korea inside China.

These changes are attributable to China's own internal and external situational changes. Firstly, China and North Korea have recognitional and strategic contradictions on the nuclear issues, which is related to the core of strategic interests for the two countries. China, under Xi's administration, has clarified definitions of "core interests" and has established integrated security organizations, promoted great maritime power, and proceeded PLA reform to defend its core interests. China has been considering North Korean nuclear tests as an obstacle for it to expand regional influence and as a potential safety hazard to its national safety. Secondly, China's international status as a major power has been transforming. Xi has proposed the concept of "major-power diplomacy" to proceed with objectives of mutual benefits and joint development with other states with its heightening international status as a "responsible" big power. Therefore, it is increasingly problematic for China to shield North Korea's behaviors. Thirdly, the rather intimate relationship between China and South Korea under Xi and Park is another reason of China's assertive attitude towards North Korea. Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship between China and North Korea have no substantial variations for geopolitical and strategic interests.

On North Korean nuclear issue, China and South Korea have differences on recognition of the problem. The two countries both stick to the principles of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, South Korea strains North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and anticipates China to heighten its degree of sanctions on North Korea. And China prefers negotiations and dialogues to press on North Korea. Thus, after North Korea left the Six Party Talks, South Korea required North Korea to list specific plans for denuclearization but China put its emphases on the resumption of the Six Party Talks, which can be viewed as 'sleep in the same bed but dream different dreams.'

VI. Conclusion and Future Prospects

In a word, based on the theoretical framework of classical realism which puts emphases on both domestic and international factors, it is clear that China's policy towards South Korea has its own consistency and Xi's South Korean policy has also succeeded policies of previous administration. Yet, due to the shifts in international and domestic circumstances, Xi's administration has done subtle fine-tuning and has shown more assertive behaviors over issues related to its core interests compared with previous administrations.

Diplomatic Strategy of Xi Jinping's government contains ambivalence that consists of both successions and deviations from previous administrations. Successions of diplomatic strategy from previous administrations are awareness of state of affairs, diplomatic objectives, and foreign policies towards big powers, neighboring states, developing states, multilateral diplomacy and other domains.

About deviations, there are three characteristics of Xi Jinping administration's diplomatic strategy that deviate from previous administrations, which are to establish "major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics," to clarify regulations on "core interests," and to carry out new "peripheral diplomacy." To defend "core interests," Xi has taken several new measurements with a more proactive approach to China's foreign relations, which are to establish integrated security organizations, to build China into a "great maritime power," and to reorganize People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Unlike Hu's and Jiang's administration, Xi's administration has been promoting its relationship with North Korea as a normal-country relationship and actively presenting diplomatic offensive towards South Korea. Regarding Xi's stance and policies toward Park Geun-hye's administration, Xi's administration has made efforts to sever the Asia's alliance triangle of US-Japan-South Korea by separating and drawing South Korea from the triangle to enhance its influence on

the Korean Peninsula. Xi's administration also decided on a hardline policy toward North Korean nuclear issues. But the THAAD deployment has put brakes on Xi's South Korean strategy. The THAAD deployment symbolizes consolidation of the US-Japan-South Korean triangular alliance in the Asia-Pacific, and threatens China's core interests and aroused backlash from the PLA, which are the significant measurements of Xi's diplomatic strategy.

On May 10 of 2017, Moon Jae-in became the President of South Korea after the impeachment of his predecessor, Park Geun-hye. After his inauguration, Moon immediately has a phone call with Xi, expressing his wish to restore Sino-South Korean relations. After that, Moon sent Lee Hae-chan, the former Prime Minister to China to meet Xi. During the meeting between Xi and Lee, Xi emphasized that China and South Korea should bring the bilateral relationship to the normal track as soon as possible. While, the Foreign Minister Wang Yi demanded South Korea to remove the obstacles of the bilateral relationship, which implicitly referred to the THAAD deployment. Since July 6 of 2017, Xi and Moon had three times of summit conferences by far. Yet, the THAAD deployment is an extremely complicated issue which is tough to be resolved in a short period. China is not willing to see the Sino-South Korean relationship deteriorates into a total catastrophe, because the largest beneficiary would be the United States if the bilateral relationship between China and South Korea gets worse. Therefore, it is uncertain that what sort of measurements China will take to resolve the problem, but it will resolve conflicts through dialogues and negotiations with South Korean government.

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국 문 초 록

중국과 한국은 1992년 8월 24일 한중 선린우호 협력관계를 합의하였다. 한중 수교 이전 한중 양국은 이미 간접 무역의 방식을 통해 경제교류를 활발히 진행한 바가 있다. 이는 한중 양국의 상호 접근에 기반을 마련하였다. 한중 수교 이후, 한중 관계는 비약적인 발전을 이룩하였다. 단적인 예로, 한국은 지난 2015년 미국과 일본이 주도하는 세계은행과 아시아개발은행에 대항하는 중국 주도의 아시아인프라 투자은행에 창립 국의 신분으로 가입하였고, 같은 해 한중 양국은 자유무역협정을 체결하였다.

시진핑은 2012년 11월 15일 중국공산당 중앙군사위원회 주석 및 중국 국가주석의 신분으로 새로운 정부를 출범하였다. 시진핑 정부는 출범과 동시에 이전 정부가 직면한 국내외 환경과는 전혀 다른 새로운 국제 및 국내 환경과 마주하게 되었다. 중국공산당의 특수한 특징으로 인해 중국의 외교 전략과 대한국정책은 일정한 일관성을 띄고 있다. 하지만 2008년 세계금융위기 이후 중국의 경제력 및 군사력의 부상으로 인해 중국의 외교전략 및 대한국정책도 일정하게 변화하고 있다.

이 논문은 고전적 현실주의를 운용하여 시진핑 정부가 직면한 국내외 환경 변화를 분석하고 시진핑 정부의 외교 전략과 대한국정책의 특징을 이전 정부와의 비교 속에서 유추하려 한다.

주요어: 중국, 한국, 한중관계, 대한국정책, 외교전략, 시진핑, 박근혜, 사드, 고전적 현실주의

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